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CtJts ,~X tltlj 6-1  Introduction 
1.1  Background 
It is generally acknowledged that the use of pesticides 
1 has large benefits to farmers and 
society2•  For example, pesticide use has been one of the major factors in improving effi-
ciency in  agriculture. Without these products,  pest losses would  make specialised crop 
and livestock production systems impractical.  Estimates in  the Unned States have indi-
cated that the use of pesticides has  been  responsible for about one-fifth  of the gain  in 
productivity  since  the  second  World  War.  Moreover,  it  has  been  estimated  that there 
would be a substantial reduction  in  crop output,  about 25%, · if pesticides would  not be 
used anymore on farms in the United States (see Szmedra, 1991 ).  Next to securing crop 
output and enabling specialisation,  th~ use of pesticides has made it possible to fulfil the 
many critical consumer wishes with respect to agricultural products, such as the demand 
for impeccable red apples. 
Notwithstanding these positive qualities, the present use of pesticides in  agriculture also 
causes negative environmental effects (see Reus et al. 1994). In general, during and after 
application of pesticides a substantial amount of it ends up  in  soil,  ground- and surface 
water or air.  The presence of pesticides in  these domains may  constitute considerable 
negative effects to ecosystems and  human health.  For example,  human  health  may  be 
effected by pesticide residues on food and in drinking water and by direct exposure during 
application, while ecosystems may be effected by a loss of biodiversity. In fact, the use of 
pesticides in agriculture can affect wildlife both directly, through accidental poisoning, and 
indirectly, by depleting the food chains (see RSPB, 1998). 
The above-mentioned  negative  environmental  and  health-related  effects  of the  use of 
pesticides in agriculture demands for an effective policy to reduce the use of those pesti-
cides which are the most harmful. Such policies have been initiated,  both at the level of 
the individual Member States of the  European  Union and  at the  level of the  European 
Union itself. 
Policies initiated in the Member States differ (see Reus et al,  1994; Oppenheimer Wolff & 
Donnelly, 1996; DHV, 1998). In Denmark and Sweden, for example, a levy on pesticides 
has been introduced in a way to change the farmer's behaviour with respect to using pes-
ticides.  Moreover, these· countries, together with France and the Netherlands, have initi.:. 
This study deals with  the plant protection  products which  are covered  by Council  Directive  91/414/EEC. 
These products are mainly used in  agriculture an.d  usually  referre~ to as  pesticides. Yet,  in  EU  legislation 
pesticides are divided into plant protection products and biocides. Hence, when the word 'pesticides' is used 
in this report, it should be recognized that the plant protection products are meant as covered by Council Di-
rective 91/414/EEC. 
The latter has been challenged by Waibel and Fleischer (1998), who have monetarized the social costs and 
benefits of German pesticide policy. Their results seem to indicate that the use of pesticides in  agriculture 
impose a net social loss to German society. It should be mentioned, however, that the results of Waibel and 
Fleischer have been criticized by the scientific world. 
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of pesticide used in the agricultural sector. In contrast, reductions in the use of pesticides 
in Germany and Italy to a large extent are achieved without government interventron (see 
Oppenheimer Wolff & Donnelly, 1996). 
In the European Union the key objectives with regard to ·the use <?f pesticides have been 
set in 1992 in the  ffh  Environmental Action Program (FEAP). The ultimate aim of FEAP is 
to "transform the patterns of growth in the Community in such a manner that the path to a 
sustainable future can be followed". With respect to the use of pesticides FEAP targets a 
decrease in  the input of chemicals to the point that none of the basic natural processes 
indispensable for a sustainable agricultural sector are affected.  More specifically,  a sig-
nificant reduction in the use of pesticides alongside a conversion to methods of integrated 
pest  management,  mainly  in  areas which  are  important for  nature  conservation,  have 
been set as targets up to the year 2odo. 
At present, Council Directive 91/414/EEC of 15 July 1991  concerning the placing of plant 
proteCtion  products on the  internal market is  probably the most prominent regulation  of 
the. European Union with respect to pesticides
3
• Whereas administrating Council Directive 
91/414/EEC will decrease the number of active ingredients on the internal market, as well 
as the number of individual pesticides, full implementation is expected to take quite some 
time. According to Oskam et al. (1997) it is very unlikely that the target of full implementa-
tion in the year 2003 will be reached given the current working progress. In fact, estimates 
indicate that it may welt  take some 20 years before the full  impact of Council  Directive 
91/414/EEC control over pesticides in the European Union can be achieved. 
Given the expected implementation problem, and the fact that administrating Council Di-
rective 91/414/EEC will only ensure specified  safety  standard  for pesticides without di-
rectly affecting the quantities  us~d. there seems a need to broaden the current European 
Union policy on pesticides to meet the targets as set in FEAP. 
In this regard,  DG-~1 has initiated a long-term project in co-operation with the Dutch Min-
istry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment, aimed at developing and evaluating 
new strategies for a future European Union plant protection policy. This project consisted 
of two phases. The first phase was concluded  in  1994 and  resulted  in  two reports:  To-
wards a future EU plant protection product policy (Reus et. al., 1994) and Pesticide use in 
the EU (Brouwer et.. al.,  1994). After a workshop,  held within the same year,  it was de-
cided that more specialised investigations were required to-address the different problem 
areas identified in this phase of the project. 
3  Council Directive 91/414/EEC is intended to harmonize the pesticides registration systems now in existence 
in the 15 Member States, It establishes common rules which are to be applied in approving - or rejecting -
active ingredients in  plant protection products. These rules include health and environment-related criteria 
set forth in the so-called Uniform Principles.  · 
ElM  I Haskoning  5 -
The 'terms of reference' for the studies that e~compassed  the second phase of the project 
related to the possibilities for an additional plant protection policy in  the European Union, 
defined  as  additional  to  the  present  EU  legislation,  in  particular  Council  Directive 
91/414/EEC. Recently, Oppenheimer Wolff & Donnelly (1997) have provided a synthesis 
report of these studies. In May 1998 a workshop was held in Brussels in which .the results 
of these studies were discussed among 125 scientists and policy makers in the European 
Union (see DHV, 1998). 
In some of these studies a levy on  pestk;ides was regarded potentially effective and effi-
. cient in  reducing the use. of (harmful) pesticides in the European Union.  For example,  in 
the study of Oskam et al.  (1997, p.  173) the potential usefulness of a levy on pesticides 
was judged as 'good'. It should be noted though that this judgement has a somewhat lim-
ited  scope:  i.e.,  when  compared to other potentially  useful  policy  instruments,  such  as 
I 
speeding up the review programme of Council Directive 91/414/EEC, the potential effec-
tiveness of a levy is regarded moderate by Oskam et al. (1997, p.  199). 
Acknowledging the potentially usefulness of a levy to reduce the· use of (harmful) pesti-
cides in  the European  Union,  the main  economic,  environmental and health-related ef-
fects of such a levy should  be  investigated thoroughly before some EU  wide regulatory 
framework for the taxation of these products can be decided on.  To a large extent,  the 
costs of the levy will be beard upon by the farmers, manufacturers and industry, whereas 
the benefits will  mainly result to society by  means of a cleaner local and regional envi-
ronment. Important questions which need to be answered, are: 
•  what would be the impact for the farmers? 
•  ·what would be the impact for manufacturers and industry? 
•  what would be the impact for employment in Europe? 
•  what would be the administrative costs of the levy? 
•  what would be the benefits to the environment? 
Basically, the introduction of a levy on pesticides could be justified, if the benefits exceed 
the costs. When this is the case,  a best working  EU  wide regulat<;>ry  framework for the 
taxation of pesticides should be designed. 
It is evident that a quantification of the benefits to the environment are difficult, if not im-
. possible, to obtain. The available valuation methods which can be used to calculate these 
benefits are still debatable. Also with respect to a quantification of the costs severe prob-
lems will occur. Consequently, conducting the ~ideal' comprehensive cost-benefit analysis 
on  the introduction of a levy on  pesticides should  be  regarded  as imaginary.  Neverthe-
less, this study aims at answering the first question stated above: on the economic effects 
for the farmers involved.  Moreover, the potential environmental benefits of a levy will be  · 
discussed qualitatively.  ' 
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framework on the taxation of pesticides by answering questions, such as: 
•  what would be the most efficient imposition points for  the levies? 
•  what would be the most effective charge basis? 
•  what would be the optimal charge rate? 
•  what would be the best .reimbursement system? . 
Whereas the above-stated questions on  a best working regulatory framework are clear, 
answers are not easily to provide since there is little experience with respect to a levy on 
pesticides. Of the fifteen Member States of the European Union only Denmark and Swe-
den have some practical evidence on this subject. 
1.2  Objective of the study 
Given the distinct character of a European  Union wide levy on  pesticides and  the little 
experience in the individual Member States on this subject it seems justified to represent 
such a levy as a kind of 'grey box': with respect to its economic effects, with respect to its 
environmental effects and with respect to a best working regulatory framework. As a con-
sequence, the key objective of this study will be to enlighten this grey box. 
Such  a  process  of enlightenment  is  warranted,  given  the  expected  environmental  im-
provements in the European Union and the need to harmonise the internal market on this 
subject: i.e.,  in case a levy on pesticides would be defined by the ·commission, the basic 
elements of this levy should  hold .for the whole European Union to  avoid discrimination 
between the Member States. Note that a European Union wide levy on  pesticides would 
be in line with FEAP which proposes to broaden the range of policy instruments from di-
rect regulation towards economic instruments. 
The study will evaluate and quantify, to the extent possible, the main economic and envi-
ronmental effects of a levy on pesticides. Thereby the concept of pesticide chains will be 
used: i.e., the effects of a levy will be analysed for a specific type of pesticide,- a specific 
type of crop, and a specific region. The underlying _motives for using this kind of method-
ology will be explained in chapter 2. 
Besides this,  the study aims at producing results which should allow the Commission to 
define an EU wide regulatory framework on the taxation of pesticides, if necessary, alike 
the one on energy products (see CEC,  1997). This means that developing a best workin.g 
system for an EU wide levy on pesticides forms an important part of the study. 
Given the above-stated objectives of the study, the following  research questions will  be 
answered in this study: 
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of pesticides useful for developing an EU wide regulatory framework for levies on pes-
ticides? 
2.  What would constitute the ideal EU wide levy on pesticides? 
3.  Are there potential bottlenecks,  if any,  which could hinder the introduction of such a 
levy on pesticides? 
4.  What are the main economic and environmental effects of an  EU  wide levy on  pesti-
cides? 
5.  What would  constitute  the  ideal  EU  wide  regulatory  framework  for  levies  on  pesti-
cides? 
·• 
These research questions will be dealt with successively in  this study. The first,  second 
and third question will be analysed in  chapters 2,  3 and 4. The fourth research question 
will be answered in chapter 5, and the last research question- 'What constitutes the ideal 
EU wide regulatory framework for levies on pesticides?' - will be tackled in chapter 6. 
1.3  Structure of the report 
This section presents the r:nain subjects of the various chapters in the study. 
Chapter 2 deals with the scope and methodology of the study. As for the scope, the study 
will be directed to the use of pesticides in agriculture. The key motives for this restriction 
are elaborated. In this regard,  section 2.2 provides insights into the use of pesticides in 
the agricultural sector of the EU. As for the methodology, the concept of pesticide chains 
is explained in section 2.3. 
Chapter 3 discusses the usefulness of market-based instruments to reduce pesticide use 
in  agriculture. In this respect, section 3.2 compares six types of policy instruments to in-
fluence farmers' behaviour on  using pesticides.  Section 3.3 goes into the usefulness of 
market-based  instruments to reduce  pesticide  use,  while section  3.4  defines the  ideal 
case with respect to a levy on pesticides. After this, section 3.5 reviews the present situa-
tion in the individual Member States on reducing pesticide use by means of a levy.  In the 
final section of this chapter, conclusions will be drawn with reference to the first three re-
search questions stated in section 1.2  .. 
Chapter 4 introduces the model that has been developed to analyse the main economic 
and environmental effects of an EU wide levy on pesticides. Before describing this model, 
section 4.2 proposes a classification of the pesticide used in  agriculture on the basis of 
their effects to  t~e aquatic environment. This classification will_ be used in  desig.ning  the 
levy systems for the various pesticide chains in chapter 5.  After a brief description of the 
underlying theoretical framework in  section 4.3, an economic model is defined in section 
4A. With this model, topics, such as the achieved reduction in the use of pesticides, the 
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with.  Finally,  in  section 4.5 the results of a review on  the price elasticity's of demand of 
pesticides is presented.  · 
Chapter 5 analyses the main economic and environmental effects of a levy on  pesticides 
for the pesticide chains selected. In the first section of this chapter the choice for selecting 
the various chains will be motivated. The next section considers the information which is 
needed to use the economic model satisfactory. As this information is not always avail-
able, various assumptions had to be  mq_de.  Section 5.3 will elaborate on  these assump-
tions.  Section 5.4 presents the outcomes of the various pesticide chains.  Each chain will 
be  presented  in  a pre-determined format.  In  the final  section of the chapter conclusions 
will be drawn with reference to the fourth research question stated in section 1.2. 
Chapter 6 deals with designing an  EU. wide regulatory framework for levies on  pesticides. 
Using the existing  regulatory framework on the taxation of energy products,  five conse-
quential elements have been  selected:  i.e.,  the  products involved,  the charge base,  the 
charge rate, the imposition points and the allocation of  the revenues. These elements are 
discussed  in  separate  sections.  By  using  the  information  of the  preceding  chapters, 
propositions will be formulated for each consequential element. Consequently, in  section 
6. 7 a best working system for an  EU  wide regulatory framework for levies on  pesticides 
will be suggested. 
Finally, chapter 7 presents the key conclusions of the study. 
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2.1  Defining the study 
Pesticides are being used in various economic sectors, such as agriculture (including for-
estry),  transportation  (railroads),  industrial  zQnes,  parks  and  households  (gardens). 
Among these sectors, agriculture is the major user.  About 80  to  90o/o  of all pesticides in 
the European Union are being sold to farmers (Brouwer et al.,  1994). Given the enormous 
area which is-cultivated by farmers in  the European Union today,  and  thus the potential 
negative effects of pesticides to the environment (soil  and  water),  it is  only  sensible to 
focus this study on the pesticide used in the agricultural sector. 
The next definition of the study  relate~ to the countries involved.  Since one of the basic 
aims of this study is to sketch the  co~tours of a European  Union wide regulatory frame-
work for levies on  pesticides, the countries involved in thi.s study are the Member States 
of the European Union. This means that both the desk-research and the pesticide chains 
are directed at these Member States. 
The study will focus on the main economic and environmental effects of a levy on  pesti-
cides. The economic effects involved are directed to the farmers but can be ag_gregated to 
the agricultural sector.  Economic effects at the national or the  EU  level cannot be  ana-
lysed by  the model developed  in  this study (see chapters 4 and  5).  The environmental 
effects analysed will be directed to the aquatic ecosystems.  Due to  the character of the 
model, the effects described in this study wiiJ be biased to the economic side. 
An important element of this study is that existing data have to be used. Therefore, desk-
research and expert-interviews are the basic ingredients of this study. With respect to the 
latter, experts were contacted in a way to design the outline of this study more clearly and 
to collect the data for the various pesticide chains selected. (The procedure used to col-
lect these data is explained in Annex I.) 
The remaining sections of this chapter deal with three topics.  First,  section 2.2  provides 
some insight into the  use of pesticides  in  the  Member States  of the  European  Union, 
based on  sales figures.  Second, section 2.3 discusses some key factors behind the use 
of pesticides in  order to gain more understanding in the potential effectiveness of a levy 
on pesticides. Third, section 2.4 elaborates on the concept of pesticide chains: a concept 
which  forms  an  important element in  this  study.  Finally,  the  major conclusions  will  be 
drawn. 
2.2  The use of pesticides in· agriculture 
It is difficult to gain a clear insight in the use of pesticides in the agricultural sectors of the 
Member States of the European Union. The information needed - the use of pesticides at 
the farm,  split up by  type,  frequency  and  quantity - is  only  available in  some Member 
States and for a restricted number of farms.  For example, in the Netherlands a small pre-
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information is  collected  for a relatively  large group of farmers - about 60.000 - on  the 
yearly  amount spent on  pesticides  (this  is  the  so-called  Farm  Accountancy Data  Net-
work). Whereas this information is interesting with regards to economic aspects, such as 
the share of pesticide costs in the output or in  the variable costs, the information is  less 
useful with regards to environmental aspects: i.e., the amounts spent on pesticides do say 
little about the types and quantities used. 
As the information n.eeded is lacking for the whole European Union, the use of pesticides 
in the agricultural sectors of the Member States has been estimated on the basis of sales . 
figures (see,  Brouwer et al.,  1994). Whereas the correlation  bE;!tween  sales figures  and 
pesticide use wifl  be  high  and  positive,  the correlation  between  sales figures  and envi-
ronmental effects of pesticide use  wi~l be  less evident. As an  illustration  ·o~ the range of 
quantities involved,  Table 2.1,  provides an  overview of pesticide  use in  the agricultural 
sectors of the Member States for the period 1990-1993. 
Table2.1  Pesticide use in agriculture: 1990 - 1993  (in tons active ingredients) 
1990  1991  1992  1993 
Greece  19.923  16.369  12.814  9.260 
Finland  2.037  1.721  1.404  1.279 
Netherlands  18.835  17.306  15.921  11.585 
Denmark  6.428  5.620  5.725  4.277 
Austria  4.690  4.486  3.869  3.983 
Germany  33.146  36.944  33.570  29.350 
Italy  87.924  84.747  81.571  78.394 
France  97.701  103.434  84.709  88.492 
Sweden  11.008  8.007  8.693  8.915 
Belgium  10.264  9.969  10.426  10.282 
Portugal  9.337  9.355  6.117  9.426 
Ireland  1.877  2.006  2.322  2.523 
UK  23.592  24.662  23.800  33.240 
Luxembourg  253  253  253  253 
Spain  29.501  29.501  29.501  29.501 
:rota/  356.516  354.380  320.695  320.760 
Source: Brouwer et al.  1994. 
In  Table 2.2 the fifteen  Member States of the  European  Union  have been  ordered  ac-
cording to their share in the use of pesticides for the year 1993. From this Table it can be 
seen that two Member States- France and Italy- accounted for more than half of all pes-
ticide use in the European Union in 1993: 52%. The shares of these two countries remain 
almost the same in the period 1990 tot 1993: around 28% for France and 24% for Italy. 
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1990  1991  1992  1993 
France  27,4  29,2  26,4  27,6 
Italy  24,7  23,9  25,4  24,4 
U.K.  6,6  7,0  7,4  10,4 
Spain  8,3  8,3  9,2  9,2 
Germany  9,3  10,4  10,5  9,2 
Netherlands  5,3  4,9  5,0  3,6 
Belgium  2,9  2,8  3,3  3,2 
Portugal  2,6  2,6  1,9  2,9 
i 
Greece  5,6  .,  4,6  4,0  2,9 
Sweden  3,1  2,3  2,7  2,8 
Denmark  1,8  1,6  1,8  1,3 
Austria  1,3  1,3  1,2  1,2 
Ireland  0,5  0,6  0,7  0,8 
Finland  0,6  0,5  0,4  0,4 
Luxembourg  0,1  0,1  0,1  0,1 
Source: ElM 
Next to the two main users of pesticides in  the European Union,  three other countries -
the United Kingdom, Spain and Germany- were responsible for another 29% of the total 
pesticide  use  in  the  European  Union  in  1993.  Together,  the  five  Member  States  ac-
counted  for 81%  of total  pesticide  use  in  the  European  Union  in  1993.  The 'Other  ten 
Member States were responsible for the remaining 19%. 
Even the smaller Member States with regards to the use of pesticides in  the agricultural 
sector can be divided into two groups. The first group consists of Member States with an 
estimated share of pesticide use of about 3% each: the Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, 
Greece a11d  Sweden. The remaining five Member States of the European Union have _an 
estimated  share of pesticide use of about 1% each:  Denmark,  Austria,  Ireland,  Finland 
and Luxembourg. 
The above-mentioned order, although somewhat dated,  seem to imply that a majority of 
the pesticide chains selected should be directed to the dominant users of pesticides in the 
European Union: France, Italy, United Kingdom, Spain and Germany. The remaining pes..; 
ticide chains could be directed at the other Member States of the European Union, with a 
preference for Belgium, Sweden, Portugal, the Netherlands and Greece. 
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Whereas the information displayed in  Table 2.1  and 2.2 is  illuminating,  it is certainly not 
conclusive to design a European Union wide regulatory framework for levies on pesticides 
on.  For that reason,  more decisive standards are needed,  such as the intensity of  pesti-
cide use and  the efficiency of  pesticide use.  Table 2.3 presents estimates of both  stan-
dards for the period 1993 to 1995. 
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a)  Recent evidence suggests that this figure is far too high. A  more realistic estimate seems to lie  in  the 
order of 5 to 8 kg per hectare. 
Source: Oskam et al. (1997) 
The intensity of  pesticide use provides relevant information with respect to the potential 
negative effects to. the environment.  In  general,  a  higher intensity will  lead to a  higher 
thr~at, as more pesticides are being used per hectare. From the second column of Table 
2.3 it can be seen that Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy have a high intensity of pesti-
cide use.  In Belgium, for example, on average 13.8 kg  active ingredients were used per 
hectare arable and horticulture land in the period 1993 to 1995. In the five dominant users 
of pesticides- Italy, France, the United Kingdo.m,  Spain and Germany- on  average 5.2 
kg active ingredients were used per hectare arable and horticulture land. 
The efficiency of  pesticide use provides relevant information with respect to the potential 
effectiveness of a levy on pesticides. In general, a high efficiency of pesticide use, which 
relates to a small number in the last column of Table 2.3, may lead to a low effectiveness 
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2.3 it can  be  seen  that Finland,  Greece and the Netherlands have a high  efficiency of 
pesticide use. In countries, such as Portugal, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom levy-
ing pesticides seem to have a greater financial impact to the farmers involved. 
On the basis of the  information on  the intensity of pesticide use it seems necessary to 
include in the set of pesticide chains at least some crops which. are cultivated in  'high in-
tensity countries', such as the Netherlands and  Belgium,  and  in  'low intensity countries', 
such as Finland,  Denmark and Sweden.  By  the same token,  the information on the effi-
ciency of pesticide use suggests that c~ains from 'polar' Member States such as Finland 
and  the  United  Kingdom or the  Netherlands and  Portugal  should  be  included  to  get a 
~lear view on the potential effectiveness of a levy on pesticides. 
While the two standards in Table 2.3 ~re more decisive than the one in Table 2.1, all three 
of  -them  have no direct relationship wi'th  the negative effects of pesticides to the environ-
ment.  This is because not all  active ingredients pose the same hazards to the  environ-
ment.  For example, the 13.8 kg  active ingredients which -are  put on the arable and horti-
culture land of Belgium,  on average,  could be  less harmful to the environment than the 
5.6 kg active ingredients put o'n French arable and horticulture land. 
The actual  environmental  hazards of pesticides  depend  on  many  factors,  such  as  the 
quantities used, .the equipment used, frequency of spraying, the type used , and the pe-
riod of using the pesticides. To get a more informative insight into the environmental haz-
ards of pesticides as well as into the potential effectiveness of a levy on  pesticides,  the 
concept of pesticide chains is introduced. Section 2.4 will elaborate on  this topic.  Before 
that, the next section discusses some key factors that determine the use of pesticides. 
2.3  Decisive factors behind the use of pesticides 
From Table  2.1  and  2.3  it can  be  seen  that pesticide  use  differs  acro~s the  Member 
States of the European Union. To a large extent these differences can be resolved to four 
groups of decisive factors, i.e.: 
•  agronomic factors; 
•  economic factors; 
•  policy factors; 
•  farm-related factors. 
Agronomic factors 
The group of agronomic factors  include f9ctors,  such  as the general  weather and  soil 
conditions in _a  country and the (corresponding) cropping  pattern.  These factors are im-
portant sine~  ·they determine to a large extent the type of pesticide used and the dosage 
per hectare. In the Netherlands, for example, the intensity of pesticide use is high due to a 
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mate in the Netherlands generates good conditions for weed and fungi.  Countries, such 
as Italy, France and Spain,  use more insecticides as their subtropical climate generates 
good conditions for i_nsects. 
It should be noted that agronomic factors are difficult to influence,,  although the CAP has 
some effect on the choice of crops. A European Union wide regulatory framework for lev-
ies  on  pesticides  should  take  into  account  the  countries'  specific  agronomic  circum-
stances in order to be acceptable. 
Economic factors 
The·group of economic factors include factors, such as the crop intensity, the price of al-
ternatives to pesticides and  the effici13ncy  of pesticide use.  In  Belgium,  crop intensity is 
relatively high due to a shortage of agricultural land. A high crop intensity usually results 
in a high use of pesticides to counteract crop-specific weeds, fungi, etceteras. A high effi-
ciency of pesticide use usually also generates a high dosage of pesticides per hectare. In 
fact, the larger the difference between the pesticide costs and crop benefits, the less in-
centives there will be for the farmer to reduce his use of pesticides.  Generally,  the  key 
criterion for the farmer is not the retail price of the pesticides but their agronomic effec-
tiveness.  Note that the price of crop protection is only a small item on  the budget of the 
farmer, whereas the consequences of using ineffective pesticides are huge. 
Compared to the above set of agronomic factors,  economic factors can be influenced by 
the Commission.  For example,· the price of pesticides can. be increased by  means of a 
European  Union wide levy,  whereas the  benefits of the crops can  be  influenced  by  the 
CAP. The crop intensity in a country is, however, more difficult to influence. 
Policy factors 
The group of policy factors encompasses the set of governmental instruments which are 
used  to  reduce the use of pesticides.  Types of instruments that could  be  used  include 
regulation,  information, persuasion, arrangements, technological improvements and eco-
nomic incentives (see chapter 3). Which instruments are actually used depends to a large 
extent on  the political climate in  a country.  The intensity of the activities which  arouse 
-from the government often depends on  many factors,  such as the political power of the 
agricultural sector, the potential conflicts between nature and agriculture in a country. but 
also on the country's dependency on groundwater (e.g. Denmark). 
Farm-related factors 
It is well known that farmers living in the same region and having the same cropping pat-
tern, can have large differences in their use of pesticides. These differences can be linked 
to farm-specific factors and farmer  -specific factors. With respect to the farm-specific fac-
tors, Buurma (1997) claimed that a farm's history in relation to the number of crop failures 
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farm level could also be influential, such as the cultivation of apples under windbreaks. 
With respect to the farmer  -specific factors,  the attitude of the farmer to the use of pesti-
cides could be important: i.e., to-what extent is he interested in alternatives to pesticides?, 
and how effective is the communication between the agricultural advisory service and the 
farmer?4  Answers to  these  kind  of questions will  certainly  illuminate the  differences  in 
pesticide use at the farm,  and at the same time constitute the materials for an  effective 
European Union wide regulatory framework for levies on pesticides. 
The above set of decisive factors stands behind  the use of pesticides at the farm  (see 
also Produce Studies, 1996). It should be noted that the price of pestici~es is only one of 
these factors.  Moreover,  as  the price. of crop protection is a relatively small item on  the 
budget of the farmer one should be realistic rather than optimistic with respect to the po-
tential effectiveness of. a European Union wide levy on pesticides. 
2.4  The concept of pesticide chains 
Analysing the effects at the level of  the farms 
Ideally, the potential effects of a levy on pesticides should be analysed at the level of the 
farms: i.e., which reactions can be expected from farmers when the price of some of the 
pesticides they use will be,  say, doubled? Will, and can farmers use the pesticides levied 
more efficiently? Will, and can they turn to mechanical or biological alternatives? Will; and 
can they turn· to less levied pesticides? Or,  will they simply pay the levy? To get a good 
overview of the possible reactions, in-depth interviews with a reasonable number of farm-
ers are needed, whereby the interviews preferably are divided by type of pesticides,  in-
tensity  and  efficiency  of pesticide  use  and  agronomic  regions  in  the  European  Union. 
Whereas this  kind  of information would  be  the  most informative for this study,  it would 
also be quite laborious and  expensive to  collect.  Therefore,  a different route  had  to  be 
taken to collect the relevant data. 
Analysing the- effects at the level of  Member States 
Another possibility, almost contrary to the one above, and followed by Oskam et al. (  1997, 
p.136), is to analyse the potentiai effe<?ts of a levy on pesticides at the level of the Mem-
ber States.  Based on a review of the relevant literature, Oskam et al.  (1997) assumed a 
price elasticity of - 0.4 for all pesticides in  the Member States and analysed the overall 
effect of a price increase of 10%.  By  using a very simple calculation, a 4% reduction of 
pesticide use was established in the European Union. After deducing certain administra-
tion costs also the net revenues of a levy of 10% was calculated.  .  . 
Personal communication of Braat, 1998. 
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This route, followed by Oskam et al.,  has only illustrative significance. For example, .it is 
unclear whether one overall price increase of 1  0% would be the most effective for reduc-
ing the most harmful pesticides. 
Analysing the effects at the level of  pesticidt; chains 
In this study a middle course of aggregation is adopted for analysing  the economic and 
environmental effects of a levy on pesti9ides: i.e., the analysis will be done at the level of 
pesticide chains.  An  example of such  a  pesticide  chain  is  fungicides  in  cucumbers  in 
England and Wales.  Hence, a pesticide chain consists of a certain type of pesticide (e.g. 
fungicides,  herbicides,  insecticides),  a certain  crop in  which the  pesticide is  used  (e.g. 
c~cumbers, potatoes, winter wheat) and a certain  region  (e.g.  England  and  Wales,  the 
Netherlands). 
i 
Basically, the concept of pesticide ch<3.ins forms a· nice alternative to the ideal case of in-
terviewing a representative number of farmers. By using the concept of pesticide chains it 
is expected that enough detailed information on the types of pesticide used,  their envi-
ronmental  hazards,  their prices,  and  possible alternatives,  can  be  collected  in  order to 
provide reliable estimates of the economic and  environmental effects of a levy5.  Moreo-
ver, by using this concept it is expected that the outcomes of the pesticide chains are in-
formative enough to design a  European  Union wide regulatory  framework for levies  on 
pesticides on
6
. Therefore, the outcomes of the pesticide chains should not be too specific, 
but in one way or another be generalised to a higher level of aggregation. For e~ample, in 
the case of cucumbers in  England and Wales, the outcomes should preferably be gener-
alised to the horticultural sector in England and Wales. 
2.5  Conclusions 
· This study is defined to the  use of pesticides in  the agricultural sectors  of. the  Member 
States of the European Union. The focus of the study will be on  the main economic and 
environmental eff~cts of a levy on pesticides. 
In  order to come up with  reliable  estimates of these  effects the  concept of pesticides 
chains is introduced in this study. A pesticide chain consists of a certain type of pesticide, 
-a certain crop in which the pesticide is used and a certain region in the  European Union. 
By using this concept it is expected that, on the one hand, enough detailed information on 
the types of pesticide used, their environmental hazards, prices, and alternatives can  be 
collected in order to gain reliable outcomes, while,  on the other hand,  it is expected that 
6 
In order to come up with reliable outcomes, the concept of pesticide chains demands much information. In 
chapter 5 the exact information needs are displayed. 
It is not claimed here that an European Union wide framework for levies on pesticides should be necessarily _ 
differentiated to the level of pesticide chains. In fact, this is only one of the options. In Chapter 6 this issue 
will be elaborated on.  · 
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for levies on pesticides on. 
Therefore, the outcomes of the pesticide chains should not be too specific. From the other 
sections in chapter 2 other demands on the pesticides chains have emerged. For exam-
ple, from Table 2.3, which presented information on·the Member States' share in pesticide 
use in 1993, it is proposed that a majority of the pesticide chains should be directed at the 
dominant users of pesticides in the European Union: France, Italy, United Kingdom, Spain 
and Germany. From Table 2.4, which displayed information on the intensity and efficiency 
of pesticide use, it is proposed to include in the final set of pesticide chains at least some 
crops which are cultivated in  'high intensity countries', such as the Netherlands and Bel-
gium and 'low intensity countries', such as Finland and Sweden.  By the same token, the 
information on  the efficiency of pesticide use suggests that chains from  'polar' Member 
States as Finland  and  the  United  Ki,.{gdom  or the  Netherlands and  Portugal  should  be 
selected in order to get a clear view on the potential effectiveness of a levy on pesticides. 
With respect to the potential effectiveness of a levy on  pesticides it was concluded that 
one.should be realistic rather than optimistic. This conclusion was based on the fact that a 
large bundle of decisive factors stands behind the use of pesticides at the farm, the price 
of pesticides only being one of them. 
Finally,  it is concluded that a European  Union  wide regulatory  framework for levies on 
pesticides should  take  into account the  countries'  specific agronomic circumstances  in 
order to be acceptable. 
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the use of pesticides 
3.1  Introduction 
In  the last two decades the usefulness of market-based instruments to  reach a sustain-
able development has been acknowledged by  both the-European Union and  the OECD. 
For example,  in  order to  arrive at its  environmental  aims  the  flh  Environmental Action 
Program proposes to broaden the range of policy  instruments from  direct regulation  to-
wards financial regulation through the use of market-'based instruments (see CEC, 1992). 
Moreover, in December 1995 the European Council of Madrid concluded that 'in order to 
exploit ttlle job-creation potential of environmental protection,  these (environmental) poli-
.  . 
cies should - to a greater extent than1·at present - rely on  market based instruments,  in-
cluding fiscal ones'. 
The increased interest in  market-based instruments as a tool for reaching environmental 
aims has several backgrounds. Motives which have stimulated each other. The most im-
portant developments are: 
•  theoretical improvements in the field of environmental economics on the effectiveness 
and efficiency of marke_t-based instruments; 
•  policy changes in  the European Union with respect to  reaching  environmental goals, 
such ,as a deeper interest into the strength of the market, more interest in ways to pre-
vent environmental pollution rather than to clean-up pollution (end-of-pipe) and  more 
interest in the cost and benefits of policy measures (efficiency besides efficacy); 
•  a  certain  lack of efficiency  and  perceived  problems  concerning  the  usefulness and 
maintenance of command-and-control instruments. 
A reflection of the above developments can be found, for example,· in  OECD-surveys on 
the use of market-based instruments in the environmental policies of the Member States 
of the OECD (e.g. OECD, 1997). In these surveys, a wide range of market-based instru-
ments have been  investigated.  Table  3.1  presents  an  overview of the  situation  in  the 
Member States of  the European Union for the year 1997. 
From Table 3.1  it can be seen that a total of 182 market-based instruments were used in 
the Member States of the European  Union  in  1997 .to  reach  a variety of environmental 
goals. The Member States have. been ordered according to the total number of market-
based instruments used:  Denmark has the lead with  23  instruments,  Luxembourg is the 
last with three market-based  instruments.  More than  one-third  of all  182  market-based 
instruments (i.e. 65) are being used in three Member States: Denmark, Finland and Swe-
den. In the five Southern Countries of the European Union - Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal 
and France - a total of 43 instruments are being used (with a mean of 9). The other seven 
'middle' countries of the  European  Union -Austria, Belgium,  Germany,  Ireland,  Luxem-
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struments (with a mean of 11 ). 
Table 3 1  The use of market-based instruments in the Member States of the European Union in 1997  .. 
Countries  0  F  s  B  N  G  F  p  A  s  u  I  I  G  L  total 
e  i  w  e  e  e  r  0  u  p  K  r  t  r  u 
Env. policies  n  n  e  I  th  r  a  r  s  a  I  a  e  X 
motor fuels  4  5  6  2  3  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  40  -
other energy prod.  3  2  4  3  2  1  3  - 2  1  1  1  1  1  1  26 
vehicle taxation  2  1  2  2  2  1  - 1  2  1  - 2  2  2  - 20 
agricultural inputs  1  1  2  - - - - - - - - - - - - 4 
other goods  6  4  1  4  - - - 2.  - - - - - - - 17 
direct tax provision  2  3  1  2  1  2  1  1  1  1  1  - - - - 16 
air transport  - - 2  1  1  1  1  1  - - - - - - - 7 
water  3  2  2  3  4  3  2  2  - 1  2  - - - - 24 
waste disposal and  2  3  1  2  3  3  3  3  2  2  2  1  1  - - 28 
management 
total  23  21  21  19  16  13  12  12  9  8  8  6  6  5  3  182 
Source: OECD 1997 
With  respect to  the various environmental policies,  Table  3.1  shows that market-based 
instruments are mainly  used  for reaching  environmental goals in  the field  of waste dis-
posal and management (28 instruments) and for goals in the field of motor fuels and other 
energy products (together 66 instruments). It should be rioted that only in the field of mo-
tor fuels all Member States of the European Union use one or more market-based instru-
ments. 
With respect to environmental policies in the field of agricultural inputs, Table 3.1  displays 
that only in  the three Scandinavian Member States market-based instruments are used. 
One may wonder why such instruments are not being  used more often in  this field.  Is it 
because these .instruments are not useful here? Is it because other instruments are more 
effective? Is it because the agricultural policies of the Member Stat~s rely to a great ex-
tent on the CAP? Or, is it because agricultural lobbies prevent a widespread use of mar-
ket-based jnstruments? 
This chapter deals with the first two questions: on the usefulness of market-based. instru-
ments to reduce the use of pesticides in agriculture, in relation to other policy instruments. 
In  this  regard,  section  3.2  reviews  the  various  policy  instruments to  reduce  the  use of 
pesticides,  market-based  instruments  being  one  group of them.  Section  3.3  enters  the 
discussion on the usefulness of market-~ased ins~n.iments with respect to reducing pesti-
cides in agriculture. After this, section 3.4 sketches the contours of an ideal levy to dimin-
ish  the  adverse environmental effects of pesticides,  together with  some  practical  prob-
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reducing the use of pesticides by means of a levy is reviewed in section 3.5. Finally, in the 
last section  of this  chapter,  conclusions are drawn  with  reference to  the  first three  re-
search questions stated in section 1.2. 
3.2  Policy instruments to reduce pesticide use ir:-t  agriculture 
Oskam et al.  (1997) have analysed the usefulness of 35 policy instruments to reduce the 
use of pesticides in  agriculture.  The instruments were divided  into six groups (between 
brackets are the number of policy instruments analysed): 
•  regulation (7); 
•  information, persuasion and aware~ess  (3); 
; 
•  technological and institutional change (11 ); 
•  .  arrangements (2); 
•  market-based instruments (  1  O): 
•  private law instruments (2). 
Policy instruments in the field of regulation are still the most used in the European Union 
environmental  policy area,  despite recent statements and  appeals for a greater use of 
market-based  instruments.  An  example  of a  regulative  instrument is  Council  Directive 
91/414/EEC concerning  the  placing  of. pesticides  on  the  internal  market.  Compared  to 
regulative instruments, instruments in the field of information, persuasion and awareness 
have a voluntary basis. On the one hand, these instruments are used to support and  fa-
cilitate the introduction of other po_licy  instruments, such as regulatory ones,  on the other 
hand, these instruments are used in a way to transfer new knowledge to the farmers.  Ex-
amples include the training and educating of farmers with regards to integrated pesticide 
management. As for technological change,  the role of the Commission is usually limited _ 
to (financial) stimulation, observation and monitoring. Policy instruments in this field are, 
for example, programs on resistant and sensitive cultivates,  improvements in application 
technology and inspection programs. With respect to institutional change.  the role of the 
Commission is more straightforward insofar as it concerns reforms of the CAP,  such as 
abolishing the price support for cereals. Convenants in the field of pesticides, such as the 
'Dutch Multi-annual programme on  Plant Protection Products', are examples of arrange-
ments between  the  government and  the  sector.  Market-based instruments are  usually 
used to create incentives for the farmer to change his/her behaviour in  a more environ-
mental-friendly way.  Finally, an example of a private Jaw  instrument in  the field  of pesti-
cides is a mandatory pesticides reduction clause in land lease contracts. 
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(1997) defined six criteria, namely: 
•  effectiveness; 
•  efficiency; 
•  acceptability; 
•  enforceability; 
•  institutional homogeneity; 
•  disturbance of income levels a·nd property rights. 
On each criterion a policy instrument pould score '+++' (very high or very good}, '++', '+', 
'+/-', '-'and '-'(very low or very bad).' On the basis of these scores, Oskam et al.  (1997) 
also provided a general judgement for each policy instrument. 
Table 3.2 presents the results of Oskam et al.  (1997;  pp.  171-174) in  a condensed way: 
i.e.,  in this Table only the general judgements of the 35 policy instruments are given.  For 
example,  of the seven  policy  instruments that belong to the  group of regulation,  four of 
them were rated by Oskam et al.  (1997) with '++' (good), one of them was rated with '+' 
(moderate) and two of them were rated with'-' (low). 
Table 3.2  Evaluation of the usefulness of 35 policy instruments to reduce the use of pesticides 
type of instrument  number of  general judgements <a>  overall "order" 
instruments 
arrangements  2  2 (++)  (2.0) 
regulation  7  4 (++)  1  1 (+),  2 (-)  II  (3.0) 
technological or  institutional change  11  3 (++), 4 (+), 3 (+/-), 1 (-)  Ill  (3.2) 
market-based instruments  10  2 (++), 5 (+), 1 (o),  2 (-)  IV  {3.3) 
information, persuasion and awareness  3  1 {++), 1 {+), 1 {-)  IV  (3.3) 
private law instruments  2  1 (+), 1 (o)  VI  (3.5) 
total  35 
(a)  '++': high/good, '+': moderate, '+/-': variable between + and -, 'o': neutral. '-': low/bad. 
Source: Oskam et al. (1997) 
In  the  last column  of Table 3.2  the  general judgements of the  policy instruments .have 
been  standardised  in  a way to order the six groups of instruments with  respect to their 
usefulness to reduce the use of pesticides in  agric~lture. The process of standa-rdisation 
consisted of three steps: first, each qualitative statement was given a number:  '+~+' got a 
1,  '++' got a 2,  etceteras, second, the number of general judgements was multiplied with 
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+ 1_ x.3 + 2 x 5 =  21), finally, the result was divided by the number of policy instruments in 
the group: hence, the mean rating of the group of regulation was 3. 
After applying the above methodology,  it can  be seen from Table 3.2 that policy instru-
ments in the field of arrangements and regulation are considered by Oskam et al.  (1997) 
to be the most useful with respect to reducing pesticide use in agriculture.  Market-based 
instruments - which forms the core of this report - are ranked at the fourth place, alike in-
formation, persuasion and awareness and just after instruments in the field of technologi-
cal  and institutional change.  The use of private law instruments is  considered the least 
useful with respect to reducing the use of pesticides. 
Whereas the above order is subjective in nature,· debatable with respect to the .methodol-
ogy used, and dependent on the  poli~y instruments included in the evaluation, it is inter-
esting to note that the order in Table 3.2 corresponds to the one of a recent questionnaire 
on  the usefulness of policy  instruments for an  additional  EU  wide policy  on  pesticides. 
This questionnaire was held for the purpose of the second workshop on a framework for 
the sustainable use of plant protection product in  the European Union (DHV,  1998) and 
mailed to 52 scientists and policy makers in  the Member States of the European Union; 
24 of these people responded.
7 
One of the questions in  the questionnaire related  to a ranking  of (stated)  policy  instru-
ments (from most preferred to least preferred) with respect to four policy strategies: 
1.  a restriction of the use of highly hazardous pesticides; 
2.  an effective control of risks at use level; 
3.  a promotion of low input agriculture; 
4.  a reduction of overall use of pesticides. 
For the purpose of this study, the results of the first and last strategy are the most inter-
esting. They will be briefly presented below. 
In ordeF to restrict the use of highly hazardous pesticides (strategy 1),  respondents con-
sidered speeding up the review of Council Directive 91/414/EEC- as the most effective, 
most politically acceptable and most enforceable.-The second place was for area-based, 
bans, the third place for a mandatory certification of operators, the fourth place for a re-
stricted access to certain plant protection products, and the fifth place for voluntary certifi-
cation and training of distributors and operators. Speeding up the review of Council Direc-
tive 91/414/EEC was also considered the most useful instrument for reaching an ·overall 
Five of these respondents were environmental protection officials, four were agricultural officials, five were 
pesticide  registration  officials,  two were  representatives  of the  industry,  five were  representatives  of the 
farming sector, 2 were from NGO's and 1 was a so-called 'other'. 
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technology and inspection  ·of application were ranked at the second and third place there. 
It should be noted that a levy on pesticides was one of the nine instruments that had to be 
judged by the respondents on its usefulness to restrict the use of highly hazardous pesti-
cides  {the  first  strategy)
8
.  With  respect  to  the  criterio"n  of effectiveness  the  levy  was 
ranked at the sixth place, with respect to the criterion of acceptability it was ranked eight, 
with respect to enforceability it was ranked third. 
Both the results of the questionnaire and of Table 3.2 should not be regarded as conclu-
sive,  because the quality of the outcomes cannot be guaranteed. Nevertheless, it is diffi-
cult to ignore the signal which arouse from both analyses. When compared to other policy 
instruments there seems to be  a preference to  use arrangements and  regulative instru-
ments  {especially  speeding  up  the  r~view of Council  Directive  91/414/EEC)  to  reduce 
pesticide use in agriculture rather than market-based instruments, such as a levy on pes-
ticides. It is interesting to mention in this respect that one of the final recommendations of 
the second workshop on a framework for the sustainable use of plant protection product 
in the European Union was that 'the workshop did not find consensus on the use of  levies, 
and that they need to be further investigated'. 
3.3  Usefulness of market-based instruments to  reduce the  use of 
pesticides 
From Table 3.2  it can  be  seen that Oskam et al.  {1997)  ranked  two  instruments  in  the 
group of market-based instruments with'-+:+' {good), five with'+' {moderate), and two with 
'-'{low). In analysing the usefulness of these instruments to reduce the use of pesticides, 
it is interesting to present and  discuss the detailed judgements of Oskam et al.  {  1997) 
{see Table 3.3 on the next page). 
On the basis of their scores on the six criteria, the 10 market-based instruments in Table 
3.3 have been arranged into four groups: 
1.  -Oskam  et al.  {  1997) considered  a  uniform  high  VAT on  plant protection  products 
{ppps) as the most useful market-based instrument for reducing the use of pesticides 
in  the agricultural sector.  Although  the effectiveness of this  instrument is  regarded 
moderate {'+'),  its efficiency,  acceptability, enforceability and  (no) disturbance of in-
come and properties is judged as {very) good. 
2.  The second  group of market-based instruments  in  Table  3.3  consists  of a levy on 
ppps, adjusting some of the agri-environmental measures of the CAP and  using pre-
miums to prevent environmental hazard. Within this group, Oskam et al.  (1997) con-
sidered a levy on  ppps,  whereby the revenues are used for pesticide reducing  pro-
grams,  more useful than  the other three instruments.  The. difference with  a levy on 
8  A levy on pesticides did not have to be judged for the last strategy. 
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Also premiums _to  prevent environmental hazard is regarded as quite useful.  Should 
one of the criteria have been budget neutrality at the level of  ~he European Union, this 
instrument would have been probably ranked lower. 
Table 3.3  Detailed evaluation of 10 market-based instruments to reduce pesticide use. 
effective- efficiency  accepta- enforce  a- homoge- disturbance  general 
ness  bility  bility  neity  (income, 
property) 
uniform high VAT on ppps  +  +++  ++  +++  ++  +++  ++ 
levy on ppps (to raise budget  ++  ++  +I- +++  +  +  ++ 
for programs) 
levy on ppps (with reimburse- ++  +  +  +++  0  ++  + 
ment to fanners) 
adjusting agri-environmental  +  +  ++  +I- +  ++  + 
measures of the CAP refonn 
premiums (to prevent environ- ++  +  ++  +  +  +  + 
mental hazard) 
differentiated VAT on ppps  ++  +++  +  ?  ++  + 
levy on ppps (to be included in  ++  ++  +++  +  + 
general budget) 
reduced use of ppps as a  ++.  +  +I- +  0  0 
condition for income support 
marketable pennits  ++  +I- ++ 
insurance on yield risk  n.r.  n.r.  n.r. 
Source: Oskam et al. (1997) 
3.  The third group of market instruments in Table 3.3 consist of a differentiated VAT on 
ppps and  a levy on ppps with  the  aim to use  the  revenues for the  general budget. 
Compared to the above-mentioned instruments, these market-based instruments are 
sub-optimal due to  their low acceptability (levy)  and  low homogeneity  (differentiated 
VAT on ppps). 
4.  The  latter group of market-based  instruments  in  Table  3.3  consists  of three  instru-
ments: reduced use of  ppps as a condition for income support, marketable permits and 
insurance on yield risk. These·instruments score (very) low with respect to the criterion 
of efficiency.  Also  on  _other  criteria  these  instruments  are  inferior  to  the  above-
mentioned instruments. 
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in  Table 3.3 may be considered useful for reducing  the use of pesticides  in  agriculture, 
two of them being a levy on pesticides: 
•  a uniform high VAT on pesticides; 
•  a levy on pesticides to raise budget for programs~ 
•  a levy on pesticides with reimbursement to farmers. 
-Probably,  the major reason  behind the usefulness of a levy on  pesticides relates to  the 
fact that a levy introduces an automatic incentive for the farmer to use the pesticides more 
efficiently,  to  use other (less harmful)  pesticides qr to  use biological alternatives of the 
pesticides.  As a beneficial side-effect,  levies might stimulate a more rapid  innovation  in 
I 
industry towards less harmful  pesticides.  Another major benefit of a levy  on  pesticides 
relates to the sovereignty of the farmer to adjust his behaviour in  his own best way:  i.e., 
optimal with respect to the economy of the farm.  This characteristic of a levy warrants a 
cost-efficient reduction of pesticides in the agricultural secto~. A point of concern could be 
the  reimbursement  of the  revenues  of the  levy.  There  are  various  possibilities  (see, 
chapter 6).  If the revenues are reimbursed to  the sector,  the acceptability of the  instru-
ment will certainly increase. Moreover, an  adequate reimbursement could further reduce 
the use of pesticides, for example, by subsidising specific training programs on integrated 
· pest management. 
The use of a levy fits within the generally accepted principle that polluters should pay for 
the damage they cause to the environment.  In this case,  policy instruments for reducing 
the use of pesticides should be set at the level of the farm,  rather than at the level of in-
dustry, such as Council Directive 91/414/EEC.  In  faCt;  fariT1ers  play a central  role  in  re-
ducing the use of harmful pesticides.  Controlling the usage and dosage of pesticides at 
the farm is,  however, unworkable.  By  using a levy,  such  an  intensive controlling system 
would become redundant. 
3.4  A levy on pesticides: the ideal case 
Given the above advantages of a levy on  pesticides,  it is interesting to define the ideal 
case.  In other words,  how would_ the ideal European Union wide levy on pesticides looks 
like? Below, five conditions have been set on which such a levy should score'+++' (using 
the terminology of Oskam et al.  1997) in order to be ideal. 
Moreover,  levies are especially useful in  case of non-point pollution and  when environmental impacts are 
widespread (see RSPB,  1998}. This is certainly the case with pesticides. Levies are less appropriate when 
there are hotspots (point pollution} or where localized activities have a disproportionate impact. 
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Firstly, the ideal levy should discriminate effectively among the various pesticide used at 
the farm.  In other words, the levy should be proportional to the damage pesticides cause 
to the environment. Pesticides which are most harmful to the environment should be lev-
ied the most. 
2.  The idea/levy is set at the correct rate 
Secondly, the ideal levy should be set at the correct rate.  From· a theoretical point of view, 
this means that the amount charged to the farmers is equivalent to the marginal external 
costs of the pesticides. If set at this rate the marginal social  c~sts of using pesticides will 
match the corresponding social marginal benefits. Since it is very difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to determine the exact marginal external costs of pesticides, usually the 'correct' rate 
of the levy is determined by taking info account the efficiency of using the charged prod-
ucts (i.e.,  the efficiency of pesticide use) and  the number and  quality of environmental-
friendly alternatives.  The ideal  levy encourages farmers to  chan·ge  their behayiour in  a 
more environmental-friendly way. 
3.  The idea/levy has an efficient collection and effective reimbursement system 
Thirdly,  the  ideal  levy  should  have  an  efficient collection  and  effective  reimbursement 
system.  With  respect to the  former,  the way the  levies are collected  is  important.  The 
ideal levy is collected with a minimum of administration costs: With respect to the latter, 
the way the  revenues are returned to  those involved is important.  The  revenues  of the 
ideal levy should be reimbursed in such a way that: 
1.  a maximum accept9bility is achieved,  both at the political level and at the level of the. 
farmers, and 
2.  the use of the most harmful pesticides is reduced at the farm. 
4.  The idea/levy is fraud-proof 
Fourth, the ideal levy should be collected with a minimum of fraud  practices. Therefore, 
the levy should be set at the level of the European Union to counteract possible fraud at 
the inter-borders. Moreover, it should be feasible and maintainable· from an administrative 
point of view with little possibilities for fraud (see also chapter 6). 
5.  The levy implies  a permanent incentive to farmers 
Finally,  the levy should imply a permanent incentive to the farmers: either to use pesti-
cides more efficiently at the farm or to change to_less-harmful pesticides. This means that 
a market-based orien.ted pesticide policy of the European. Union has a long-term environ-
mental perspective rather than a short-term political perspective. 
Unfortunately, the ideal levy on pesticides cannot be established yet. Two main obstacles 
are: 
ElM  I Haskoning  27 1.  the exact environmental effects of many pesticides are not known, and, when they are 
known, the various types of environmental damages are difficult to summate into one 
single target. Hence, it is not possible to discriminate perfectly among the various pes-
ticides. 
2.  the optimal rate of the levy cannot be determined. Ori the one hand,  this is because 
the environmental effects of pesticides cannot be monetarised, on the other hand, this 
is because relevant information on the efficiency of pesticide use at the farms and the 
.  number and quality of environmental-friendly alternatives is still limited. 
These obstacles relate to the first two conditions stated above. Together they prevent the 
occurrence  of an  ideal  European  Union  wide  levy  on  pesticides.  The  remaining  three 
conditions stated above pose less major obstacles.  Hence,  it seems possible to create 
both an efficient (fraud-protection) colfection and an effective reimbursement system (see 
chapter 6).  By imposing a levy· on  pesticides to all the Member States of the European 
Union possible inter-border effects are diminished. Finally, the Commission can decide to 
design a market-based pesticide policy for the long-term  . 
. 3.5  Using levies to reduce pesticide use in agriculture: a review 
Having analysed the potential benefits of a levy on pesticides,  it is  interesting to look at 
practical experiences in the Member States of the European Union with regards to a levy 
on· pesticides.  Unfortunately,  this experience  is  limited  (see  Oskam  et .al.  1997;  Vos, 
1998;  RSPB,  1998). At the  moment,  only four countries  use  such  a  policy  instrument: 
United Kingdom,  Finland,  Sweden and  Denmark. Of these countries,  the first two use a 
levy  purely  with  the  aim  to  finance  their  pesticides  registration  system,  the  latter two 
countries use a levy with an aim to reduce the use of harmful pesticides in agriculture. 
United Kingdom and Finland 
In the United Kingdom, levies are used to finance the pesticides registration system of the 
country. Firstly, there is a target fee for the registration of a new active ingredient (this fee 
can be up to €  5,000). Secondly, there is a general fee for companies to pay towards the 
costs of post-approval monitoring of pesticides. The latter amount is a percentage of the 
UK sales of pesticide registration holders. 
In Finland, there is a 2.5%. registration charge on the net selling price of pesticides. The 
revenues of this levy are used to finance the costs of maintaining the pesticides register 
and to offset the costs of handling registration applications. Besides this levy there is also 
a target fee of about  € .1,000 for the registration of new active ingredients. 
Sweden and Denmark 
· Since 1995 Sweden has a tax on active ingredients, entailing a price increase of about  € 
2.2 per kg.·  Although there is no formal link between the revenues of this tax and govern-
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and extension work in  agriculture and forestry,  including mandatory training courses, re-
gional  plant  protection -centres  which  promote  integrated  crop  management,  advisory 
services, and voluntary testing of spraying equipment. The Swedish environmental tax on 
· active ingredients has been effective insofar as the volume of pesticides in  agriculture in 
Sweden has been reduced by 35% in the period 1981/1985 to 1995. Yet,  it should be ac-
knowledged that this reduction is mainly the indirect effect of the tax, through an efficient 
financing of advisory services,  research and development, etceteras. It is  difficult to iso-
late the direct effect of the tax:  i.e., the reduction of the use of pesticides at the farm due 
to a price increase of €  2.2 per kg active ingredient. 
In the nearby future the charge base of the Swedish environmental tax will  be changed_ 
towards the retail price of pesticides (see Vos,  1998). Such a change is  advised by  the 
Swedish  National Board  of Agriculture  the main  argument being  that pesticides  with  a 
smaller content of active ingredients, at the moment, are less affected by  the tax but do 
not necessarily have a smaller environmental impact.  By  charging the pesticides on the 
basis of their retail price such 'imperfections' could be reduced (the issue on the charge 
basis of the levy will be elaborated on in chapter 6). 
Since 1996 Denmark has a differentiated levy on pesticides. The levy differs to the type of 
pesticides: insecticides are levied  by  37o/o  of the  retail  price,  whereas herbicides, fungi-
cides and growth regulators are levied by  15%. These percentages are derived from an 
overall levy of 25% on all pesticides sold by retailers. The motive behind a higher levy on 
insecticides was based on information of a considerable over-use of this type of pesticide 
in Denmark. It is es.timated that the differentiated levy on pesticides will reduce the use of 
pesticides in agriculture in Denmark by 5 to 10% (see Jorgenson and Secher, 1996).  The 
revenues  of the  levy  are estimated  at  €  28  million  per year.  The  major part of this 
amount is transferred  back to the  agricultural sector by  reducing. the tax on  agricultural 
land. The remaining revenues of the levy will be kept in reserve to be returned later. 
Lessons to be learned 
On the basis of the above review, three lessons can be learned: 
1.  From the experiences in  Sweden it follows that the indirect effects of a relative small 
tax on pesticides could be quite large by using the revenues of the t~x effectively. 
2.  From the experiences in  Denmark it follows that a differentiated levy on  pesticides is 
possible and useful if some pesticides need to be reduced more than others. 
3.  From the experiences  in  Denmark and  Sweden  it follows  that a  levy  on  pesticides 
which is charged on the retail price of pesticides rather than on the active ingredients 
has different effects. As mentioned above, this issue will be  elabora~ed on in chapter 6 
where a  European  Union wide  regulatory  framework for levies on  pesticides will  be 
discussed. 
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In s_ection  1.2 six research questions have been formulated. On the basis of the informa-
tion in the previous sections, the first three of them can be answered. These three ques-
tions are: 
1  .  In what respect is the experience presently available in the Member States on the use 
of pesticides useful for developing an EU wide regulatory framework for levies on pes-
ticides? 
2.  What would constitute the ideal EU wide levy on pesticides? 
3.  Are there potential bottlenecks,  if any,  which  could  hinder the  introduction of such  a 
levy on pesticides? 
With respect to the first research question it can be concluded that there is little relevant 
experience available in the Member States of the European Union which is useful for the 
design of an EU wide regulatory framework for levies on pesticides. In fact, at the moment 
only  in  Sweden  and  Denmark a  levy  on  pesticides  is  used  in  a  way  to  influence  the 
farmer's behaviour. 
Whereas  the  main  economic and  environmental  effects  of the  levies  in  Denmark and 
Sweden are difficult to isolate, the levy-systems used in these two countries encompass 
interesting  lessons which  could  be  beneficial for an  EU  wide  regulatory  framework for 
levies on  pesticides.  Note that these lessons refer mainly to the or-ganisational  side of 
such a framework. From Sweden and Denmark there is relevant experience available on 
ways to reimburse the levy, on ways to charge the levy (retail price or active ingredients), 
on ways to differentiate the levy and on ways to collect  the levy. 
The ideal levy on pesticides is defined in section 3.4. Five conditions were ~ormulated: i.e. 
the ideal levy discriminates effectively among the various pesticides, is set at the correct 
rate,  has an  efficient collection and effective reimbursement system,  is  fraud-proof and 
provides a permanent incentive to the farmers. 
Of these conditions, the first two are confronted with major obstacles:  i.e.,  there is little 
knowledge on the effects of the various pesticides to the environme_nt,  and it is difficult to 
set the levy at the correct rate. Therefore, it can be concluded that from an organisational 
point of view there seem to be no major obstacles for a European  Union wide levy on 
pesticides.  Concerning the contents of the levy,  however, there are important complica-
tions. 
Next to the above conclusions, this chapter has shown that a levy on pesticides is judged 
useful in  itself (see Table 3.3). Compared to other policy instruments, such as arrange-
ments anq regulations, however, market-based instruments are not rated very high to re-
duce the use of pesticides in agriculture (see Table 3.2). ln. fact, speeding up the review of 
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the most effective policy instrument at the moment. 
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4.1  Introduction 
Up to now the study has focused on the pro's and contra's of a levy on  pesticides, when 
compared to other policy instruments (e.g.  regulations, arrangements) as well as market-
based instruments (e.g.  uniform VAT).  The general conclusion of this review was that a 
levy on  pesticides in itself can be judged as useful and potentially effective. Compared to 
other policy instruments, however, a levy is not ~egarded the most effective to reduce the 
use  of pesticides  in  the  European  Union.  Speeding  up  the  review of Council  Directive 
91/414/EEC is generally preferred by scientists and policy makers. 
Nevertheless, the  potential  effectiven~ss of an  EU  wide  levy on  pesticides warrants an 
evaluation  of its  main  economic andf. environmental  effects.  Such  an  evaluation  will  be 
presented in chapter 5.  Before that, ttie basis of this evaluation - i.e. the economic model 
used- needs to be described. This forms the contents of this chapter. Section 4.2 starts 
by presenting a classification of the pesticides with respect to their negative effects to the 
aquatic environment. This classification will be used in designing an effective levy frame-
work- for the various pesticide chains.  Section 4.3  deals with  the theoretical  framework 
that lies behind the model used to analyse the economic effects of a levy on pesticides. In 
section 4.4 the model itself is presented. Compared to. the ideal model, simplifications had 
to be made due to limitations in the availability of data. By using the model several inter-
esting aspects can be estimated, such as the impact of the levy on the use of pesticides, 
on the costs of pesticides and on the farmer's income. Section 4.5 reviews the state of the 
art with respect to the price elasticity's of demand of pesticides. Finally, section 4.6 pres-
ents the main conclusions. 
4.2  Classifying  pesticides  with  regards  to  their  effects  to  the 
aquatic environment 
An  adequate risk assessment of pesticides is  usually divided into four steps:  (I)  hazard 
identification, (II) dose-response assessment (together these two steps are also known as 
an effect-assessment), (Ill) exposure assessment and (IV) risk characterisation. 
in this study the environmental effects of the pesticides will only be estimated on the basis 
of the first step mentioned above: the hazard identification. This means that it is only con-_ 
sidered whether exposure to the substance could cause adverse effects to the environ-
ment. Such an approximation is chosen because an assessment of concentrations of the 
pesticides in the environment is not possible within the context of this study. Furthermore, 
as a worst-case approach it is assumed that the pesticides do reach the environment after 
application and that, as a result,  the individual properties of the substances will be deci-
sive for the effects to the environment. 
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The environmental effects of pesticides can be based upon the criteria described in An-
nex VI  of Council Directive 93/21/EEC (general classification and labelling  requirements 
for dangerous substances and preparations) and the criteria defined in the Uniform Prin-
ciples of Council Directive 91/414/EEC. By using these two Directives, this hazard identf-
fication follows the recommendations of Reus et al.  (  1994) who mentioned both Directives 
as suitable documents for defining the criteria and standards of impacts to the aquatic and 
non-aquatic environment. 
As a first step in the classification of the pesticides it is proposed to classify the various 
pesticides on the basis of their negative effects to the aquatic environment. It is acknowl-
edged that this option is only one of the options available,  for example,  one could  also 
classify the pesticides on the basis of their negative effects to the non-aquatic environ-
ment or to their health risks. However, following Reus et al.  (  1994) a major part of the en-
i 
vironmental impact of pesticides is  d~ected to  a contamination  of the groundwater and 
surface water.  By focusing on  the effects of the  pesticides on  the  aquatic environment 
· difficulties could result for some Member States, such as Spain, where the groundwater is 
deep under the surface and other environmental impacts are more important. 
Whereas  the  evaluation  according  to  the  Uniform  Principles  of  Council  Directive 
91/414/EEC is based on the application of toxicity-exposure ratio's, i.e  ... a combination of 
substance-intrinsic properties and  concentrations expected to occur in  the environment, 
the general classification and labelling requirements of Council Directive 93/21/EEC only 
focus on  toxicity data for substances.  Therefore,  in  this  study the classification  for the 
aquatic environment according to  Council Directive 93/21/EEC is  considered  a suitable 
approximation. 
Following the criteria for classification defined in Council Directive 93/21/EEC, substances 
shall be classified as dangerous for the environment and assigned the symbol 'N' and the 
appropriate indication of danger, and assigned  risk phrased  in  accordance with the fol-
lowing criteria: 
•  Vety toxic to aquatic organisms (RSO),  and may cause long-term adverse effects in the 
aquatic environment (R53). Acute toxicity: 
96 hr LC50 (for fish) 
48 hr EC50 (for Daphnia) 
72 hr IC50 (for algae) 
::;;  1 mg/1, or 
::;;  1 mg/1, or 
::;;  1 mg/1, 
and the substance is not readily degradable, or the log  Pow (log  octanol/water partition 
coefficient) ~  3.0 (unless the experimentally determined BCF::;; 1  00). 
•  Very toxic to aquatic organisms (RSO). Acute toxicity: 
96 hr LC50 (for fish)  ::;;  1 mg/1, or 
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72 hr IC50 (for algae) 
:5  1 mg/1, or  -
:51 mg/1. 
•  Toxic  to' aquatic organisms (R51),  and may cause long-term  adverse  effects in  the 
aquatic environment (R53). Acute toxicity: 
96 hr LC50 (for fish) 
48 hr EC50 (for Daphnia) 
72 hr IC50 (for algae) 
1 mg/1 < LC50  :5  10 mg/1, o( 
1 mg/~ < EC50  :5  1  0 mg/1, or 
1 mg/1 < IC50  :5  10 mg/1 
and the substance is not readily degradable or the log Pow  ~ 3.0 (unless the experimen-
tally determined BCF :5 1  00). 
Following the criteria ·for classification -defined in Council Directive 93/21/EEC, substances 
shall  be classified as  dangerous for the environment in  accordance with the criteria set 
out below. Risk phrases shall also be assigned in  ac~ordance  with the following criteria: 
•  Harmful to aquatic organisms (R52),  and may cause long-term adverse effects in  the 
aquatic environment (R53). Acute toxicity: 
96 hr LC50 (for fish) 
48 hr EC50 (for Daphnia) 
72 hr IC50 (for algae) 
1  0 mg/1 < LC50  :5  1  00 mg/1, or 
10 mg/1  < EC50  :5  100 mg/1, or 
10 mg/1 < IC50  :5  100 mg/1, 
and the substance is not readily degradable. 
Substances not falling under the criteria listed above, which on the basis of the available 
evidence concerning their toxicity may nevertheless present a danger to aquatic ecosys-
tems: 
•  Harmful to aquatic substances (R52). 
Finally, substances not falling under the criteria listed above ·in this chapter, but which, on 
the basis of the available evidence concerning their persistence, potential to accumulate, 
and predicted or observed environmental fate and  beh~viour may nevertheless present a 
long-term and/or delayed danger to  the  structure  and/or functioning  of aquatic ecosys-
tems.  For example,  poorly water-soluble substances,  i.e.  substances with  a solubility of 
less than  1 mg/1 will be covered by this criterion if  they are not readily degradable; and 
the log Pow~  3.0 (unless the experimentally determined BCF :5 100): 
-.  May cause long-term adverse effects in the aquatic environment (R53). 
On  the  b~sis of the  above classificatien,  _pesticides  can  be  divided  into seven  classes, 
ranging from pesticides which are very toxic to the aquatic environment and may cause 
long-term adverse effects,  to pesticides which are only harmful to aquatic organisms.  In 
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be used in the various pesticide chains (see chapter 5), and may be used as a basis for a 
charge base system of an  EU wide levy on pesticides (see chapter 6).  If the latter is the 
case, a pesticide which is regarded very toxic to aquatic organisms and may cause long-
term adverse effects in  the aquatic environment should  be  levied more than a pesticide 
which may cause long-term adverse effects in the aquatic environment (see also section 
3.4). 
Classifying the pesticides according to their  potential risk to the aquatic environment 
I.  Very toxic to aquatic organisms and may cause long-term adverse effects in  the 
aquatic environment; 
· II.  Toxic  to  aquatic  organisms f?nd  may  cause  long-term  adverse  effects  in  the 
aquatic environment; 
Ill.  Harmful to aquatic organisms  and  may  cause  long-term  adverse effects  in  the 
aquatic environment; 
IV.  May cause long-term adverse effects in the aquatic environment; 
V.  Very toxic to aquatic organisms; 
VI.  Toxic to aquatic organisms; 
VII.  Harmful to aquatic organisms. 
4.3  Analysing the effects of a levy: theoretical framework 
In the literature, various economic models exist to analyse the effects of (pesticide) levies 
on  the behaviour of households and  firms (farmers). With respect to  pesticides different 
approaches have been followed,  varying from simply rules of thumb  (~.g. Oskam et al., 
1997) to sophisticated dynamic and  behavioural models (e.g.  Oskam et al.,  1992). The 
sophisticated  models  are  either neo-classical  or based  on  linear-programming.  In  this 
study, the neo-classical approach has been adopted as it provides an  adequate tool for 
analysing the farmer's behaviGur. 
Key elements in the neo-classical approach are the production function and the farmer's 
aim to maximise his or her income. This income is defined as being equal to the differ-
ence between  revenues and  costs.  Revenues are calculated from the output price of a 
crop (assumed to be exogenous) and the quantity of crops sold. Output itself depends on 
the quantity and quality of various input factors (see below). Cost depends on the amount 
of input factors, as well as on factor prices. 
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tion: labour (L), ·capital (K), pesticide A and pesticide B. Then, the following definitions can 
be derived: 
(1)  II=  R- C 
(2)  R =  Y · Py 













amount of  crops 
price of crops (exogenous) 
amount of capital used in production 
price of capital 
amount of labour used in production 






A,B  amount of pesticides A and B used in production 
PA,  Ps  price of pesticides A and B 
Usually,  labour and capital are viewed as the 'normal' production factors.  For a  farmer, 
however,  pesticides can be seen as a  production factor too,  since without these  plant 
protection products, substantial less production of crops is possible. The total production 
of crops is positively correlated with the use of each production factor. The mathematical 
relationship between production and production factors is called the production function. 
In (4) this function is presented: 
(4)  y =  / (K, L, A,  B)  /\  >0, i = K,  L, A,  B 
f'\<0, i E  K,  L, A, B 
f\?0, i, j  E  K,  L, A,  B,  i *  j 
where: 
y  amount of crop 
K  amou"nt of capital used in production 
L  amount of labour used in production 
A, B  amount of pesticides A,  respectively B. used in production 
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From the foregoing, it follows that the representative farmer maximises his or her income 
by: 
(5)  choosing L,  K, A,  B: 
subject to 
given 
IT= R- C 
(2), (3), (4) 
Solving the mathematical problem (5) gives the following general results: 
use of production factor i 
where  X\i<O  derivative of xi with respect to the price of factor i 
. The quantity of p·roduced  crops follows from substituting the results of (6) into equation 




relative ·change of production of crops 
relative change of production factor i (i= L,  K,  A.,  B) 
share of production factor i (i= L,  K, A., B) in total costs (L1 wi= 1) 
Hence, under general assumptions 
10
,  it appears that an  introduction of a  levy on pesti-
cides will lead to an increase in costs, a reduction of the use of the levied pesticide (ac-
companied by an increase of the use of other pesticides 
11
,  and an increase of the use of 
the other factors of production), a reduction of production of crops, and therefore of reve-
. nues and a reduction of the farmer's income 
4.4  Introducing a simplified economic model 
Fully  implementing the neo-classical approach as constituted  by equations (7)  and  (4) 
necessitates the use of data which are not available yet. Thus, a simplified version of the 
economic model had to be designed, focusing on the main purposes of the study. In this 
respect, the following assumptions had to be made: the prices of capital and labour are 
1°  For example, if  the production function (4) is a CES-function 
11  Of course, when both pesticides are levied, the use of both will decrease 
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12
,  and the production function  in  (4) is a  so-Called  nested CES-function.  More 
specifically, the following production function is assumed: 
(4')  y =  CES{f(K, L), g{A, B)}  with elasticity of substitution  a 
where: 
f(K, L)  function  in  which  capital  K and  labour L  are combined,  having  the same 
properties as (  4) 
g(A, B)  function in which pesticides A a  net B are combined. 
In the simplified economic model it will be assumed that g is of the Leontief-type, that is: 




Assumption (8) follows from the observation, that with technology given, farmers tend to 
use pesticides in equal proportions. 
The above assumptions imply that factor demand equations can be written as: 
(9a)  A= constant· (pAIPv)-1J 
(9b)  8 =  constant· (Ps1Pv)-1J 
Finally, taking the log differences, and assuming the price of crops to be constant: 
(9a')  !lin A= -a · !lin PA 
(9b')  !lin 8= -a · !lin Ps 
The latter equations allows one to determine the impact of price changes on the use of 
pesticides. In analysing the impact of changes in the use of pesticides on the production 
level,  equation  (7) can  be used;  the  parameters W;  in  this equation can  be determined 
empirically. Hence, for each pesticide there is only one elasticity of substitution determin-
ing the impact of levies on the use of pesticides, and therefore on the level of crop pro-
duction. Since prices of output as well as factors of production are given, this substitution 
elasticity also determines the impact of the levies on. the f~armers' income. · 
Generally, the values of the relevant substitution elasticity's are not known, due to a lack 
of data. However, from literature research and expert knowledge, plausible values can be 
derived. Therefore, in using the simplified economic model, scenarios can be developed, 
indicating· lower and upper bands. 
12  Since only the introduction of levies on pesticides is  ~ubject of study, this seems a reasonable assumption 
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The price elasticity of demand of pesticide used in agriculture  is an important variable in 
designing an EU wide regulatory framework for levies on pesticides. For example, if pes-
ticide use is almost indifferent to price increases of pesticides, perhaps due to a high effi-
ciency of pesticide use (see chapter 2), the introduced levy will generate substantial reve-
nues whereas the direct beneficial environmental effects of the levy will  be small.  Table 
4.1  presents an  overview of studies that have estimated price elasticity's of demand of 
pesticides,  using different models, such-as regression analysis,  linear programming and 
threshold models. The studies are ordered by the country upon which the study is based. 
Table 4.1  Overview of research on the price elasticity's of demand of pesticides. 
; 
Study  country  elasticity  demand of  remarks 
1.  Oskam (1997)  EU  -0.2 to -0.5  pesticides  general overview of other studies 
2.  Elhorst (1990)  Netherlands  -0.3  non-factor  short term; arable farming, based on 
inputs  data 1980-1986 
3.  DHVand LUW  Netherlands  -0.2 to -0.3  pesticides  short term: -0.2 for arable farming; 
(1991)  -0.3 for horticulture 
4.  Oskam (1992)  Netherlands  -0.1  to -0.5  pesticides  medium term: -0.1  for mixed farms 
(potatoes, unions); -0.5 for 
specialised farms 
5.  Oude Lansink and  Netherlands  -0.5 to -0.7  pesticides  based on data 1970-1992; 
Peerlings (1995)  -0.7 is inclusive the CAP reform 
6.  Russell (1995)  UK  -1.1  pesticides  based on  26 cereals producers; 
in cereals  period 1989-1993 
7.  Falconer (1997)  UK  -0.3  pesticides  using a linear programming model 
8.  Ecotec (1997)  UK  -0.5 to -0.7  herbicides  , long term; only for herbicides used 
for cerea1 grass weed 
9.  Dubgaard (1987)  Denmark  -0.3  pesticides  using  a threshold model 
10.  Dubgaard (1991)  Denmark  -0.7  herbicides  long term; period 1971-1985 
11.  Dubgaard (1991)  Denmark  -0.8  fungicides and  long term; period 1971-1985 
insecticides 
12.  Schulze (1983)  Germany  -0.5  fungicides  usi!lg a linear programming mode_l 
13.  Johnsson (1991)  Sweden  -0.3 to -0.4  pesticides  based on filed experiments; -0:3 for 
insecticides, -0.4 for fungicides 
14.  Gren (1994)  Sweden  -0.4 to -0.9  pesticides  econometric model; -0.4 fungicides. 
-0.5 insecticides and -0.9 herbicides 
15.  SEPA (1997)  Sweden  --0.2 to -0.4  pesticides  general overview 
Source: ElM 
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the more it is specific. The reason behind this (familiar) phenomenon lies in the number of 
substitutes available to the farmer to adjust his behaviour. By putting the same levy on all 
pesticides, substitution of pesticides by other pesticides is more difficult to realise. 
Table 4.1  shows an  'overall' price elasticity of demand for pesticides between- 0.2 and -
0.5 (based on the studies no. 2,  3,  4,  5,  7,  9.-and  confirmed by study no.1  and 15). Com-
pared to the above price elasticity, the 'overall' price elasticity of demand for herbicides, 
fungicides and insecticides is higher. With respect to herbicides the price elasticity seem 
to lie between - 0.7 to - 0.9 (based on  studies no.  10 and  14),  for fungicides the price 
elasti~ity seem to lie between - 0.4 to - 0.8 (based on  studies no.  11,  12,  13,  14), for in-
secticides  the price elasticity seem to lie between - 0.3 to - 0.8 (based on studies no.  11, 
13 and  14).  Finally,  the price elasticity of demand for pesticide used for a special crop, 
such as pesticides in cereals seem to· be the highest.  From Table 4.1  the price elasticity 
for such specialised pesticides seem to lie between - 0.5 and -1.1  (based on studies no. 6 
and 8). 
Finally,  the  information  in  Table 4.1  enables one  to  conclude  that the  long-term  price 
elasticity of demand for pesticides is higher than the short-term elasticity. This is  a well-
known phenomenon in  the economic literature.  In  the  long-term,  demand may be more 
likely to be responsive to price change for ~everal reasons:  cropping practices are more 
flexible, capital investment and changes in cropping patterns are possible, etceteras (see 
RSPB, 1998). 
4.6.  Conclusions 
This chapter has shown that pesticides can be classified according to  their negative ef-
fects to the aquatic environment is possible. Seven classes have been distinguished. The 
most hazardous pesticides are those pesticides which are very toxic to aquatic organisms 
and may cause long-term adverse effects in the aquatic environment (I). The less hazard-
ous pesticides are those pesticides which are harmful to aquatic organisms (VII).  In  de-
termining the potential effectiveness of a levy on pesticides this classification will be used 
in  the next chapter. As mentioned before it may even  be  used as a basis for a charge 
base system of an EU wide levy on pesticides. 
Due to data limitations the economic model which will be used in  chapter 5 is simple in 
nature.  The theoretiCal  background  of the model  is  neo-classical oriented.  This  means 
that farmers  are  assumed  to  behave  rationally  and  aim  at maximising  their  incomes. 
Moreover, the use of pesticides is  regarded as one of the key production factors.  Under 
general assumptions, it appears that the introduction of a levy on pesticides will lead to an 
increase in variable costs, a reduction of the use of the levied pesticide, a· reduction of the 
production of crops and therefore of revenues, and a reduction of the farmer's income. 
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in_ agriculture shows an  'overall' price elasticity of demand  for  pes~icides between - 0.2 
and- 0.5. This would mean that a price increase of,  say 20%, would result in a reduction 
of the use of pesticides in the European Union between 4% and 10%. The price elasticity 
of demand for herbicides lies between- 0.7 to- 0.9, for fungicides between- 0.4 to- 0.8, 
and  for insecticides between  - 0.3  to  - 0.8.  This  information  will  be  used  in  chapter 5 
where for each pesticide chain the most appropriate price elasticity will be substantiated. 
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5.1  Selecting the pesticide chains 
In  order to evaluate the potential effects of EU  wide levy  <:>n  pesticides satisfactory,  the 
study  aimed  at analysing  at least 20  pesticide  chains  in  the  European  Union.  Such  a 
number was regarded  necessary to satisfy the various demands on  the choice of pesti-
cide chains, for example, those which emerged from chapter 2.  In  general,  the  following 
criteria are important in selecting the pesticide chains: 
•  type of pesticides and crops involved; 
•  intensity and efficiency of pesticide use; 
•  available alternative plant protection devices; 
•  environmental conditions (soil properties, climate, temperature). 
Ideally, the pesticide chains selected should encompass a representative part of the use 
ofpesticides in agriculture in the European Union. Hence, pesticide chains should be se-
leCted  in  situations with a low intensity of pesticide use and  a high  intensity,  with  a low 
efficiency and a high efficiency, with maritime and subtropical crops, with many and  few 
available alternatives,  etceteras.  On  the  basis  of the  chosen  set of pesticide  chains  it 
should be possible to provide reliable statements on the effectiveness of an  EU wide levy 
on pesticides. 
During the study it became clear that the above aim of 20 pesticide chains was too ambi-
tious. The main reason formed a lack of information in the southern Member States, such 
as Italy, Spain and France (the major users of,pesticides in the European Union, see Ta-
ble 2.2). Even though several calls have been made with pesticide experts in these coun-
tries, it was not possible for them (within the conditions of this study) to obtain the neces-
sary information to evaluate the effects of an  EU wide levy (see section 5.2 for the infor-
mation needs of pesticide chains). Moreover, it became clear that it was not reasonable to 
be too strict on the other criteria mentioned above. 
Table  5.1  presents the  ten  pesticide  chains  which  have  been  evaluated  in  this  study. 
Taken together,  these  chains  comprise  three  different types  of pesticides  (herbicides, 
fungicides  and  insecticides),  seven  different crops  (both  arable  and  horticulture)
13  and 
four different regions. To some extent,  the selected pesticide chains are biased towards 
the Netherlands. This is due to the fact that relevant data were relatively easy to get there 
and quite comprehensive. 
13  AlthoUgh using herbicides to counteract weeds at public pavements and roads does not fit within the scope 
of this study {i.e.,  pesticides used in  agriculture) this pesticide chain  has been  included  and  evaluated on 
request of DG X  I. 
ElM  I Haskoning  42 Table 5.1  Overview of selected pesticide chains 
Type of  pesticide used  Disease  Cultivated crop  Region or  country 
1.  Fungicides  mildew  lettuce  England/Wales 
2.  Fungicides  mildew  green peppers  Almeria (Spain) 
3.  Insecticides  insects  cucumbers  the Netherlands 
4.  Insecticides  insects  cucumbers  England/Wales 
5.  Fungicides  phytopthora  potatoes  Sweden 
6.  Fungicides  phytopthora  potatoes  the Netherlands 
7.  Herbicides  weeds  corn  the Netherlands 
8.  Herbicides  weeds  winter barley  England/Wales 
9.  Fungicides  rust, mildew  winter wheat  Sweden 
10. Herbicides  weeds  public pavements, roads  the Netherlands 
Source: ElM 
Due to the available information, the majority of the crops involved in the pesticide chains 
analysed, are cultivated in continental and maritime climate conditions: i.e.,  potatoes, cu-
cumbers,  corn,  winter  barley  and  winter wheat.  Unfortunately,  other interesting  crops, 
such as grapes, citrus fru_its and olives had to be excluded from the analysis. With respect 
to the types of pesticides, the chains encompass most of the pesticide used in agriculture. 
Brouwer et al.  (1994),  for example,  have estimated that the selected types of pesticides 
cover about 90% off all pesticide sales in the European Union. 
In the remaining sections of this chapter first the information needs of pesticide chains are 
described. Then, the general assumptions are discussed which underlie the evaluations. 
Section 5.4 is devoted to-the results of the ten  pesticide chains.  Finally,  the key  conclu-
sions of the pesticide chains are drawn. 
5.2  Information needs of pesticide chains 
To evaluate the effects of an  EU wide levy on  pesticides  satisfactory, for each pesticide 
chain the following information had to be collected: 
1.  identification of  the pesticide chain (crops, pesticides and regions involved): i.e., which 
crop is involved, what is the number of acres involved-!n the region, what is the num-
ber of farms involved,  which  types of farms  are  involved (mixed,  specialised,  mean 
size, etc.), which pesticides are the most crucial, which pesticides are the most used,. 
what crop diseases are involved, what is the crop's dependency on  pesticides, what 
tendency is there in the usage of the pesticides, are the pesticide used substitutes or 
are they complementary to each other? 
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of the pesticide used, per acre and per year, what are the costs to the farmer in  using 
the pesticides calculated as percentage of the output and of the variable costs. 
3.  price of  the pesticides: i.e., what is the retail price of the pesticide used and what is the 
price of the pesticides calculated per kg active ingredient. 
4.  environmental hazards of the pesticides: i.e., what are the environmental hazards in-
volved of the pesticide used, what is the relevant classification (see section 4.2) 
5.  potential alternatives: i.e., what alternatives are available for the farmer. 
As an exC!mple of the information which pesticide experts in the Netherlands, UK, Sweden 
and Spain gathered, the information s(Jeet of the chain fungicides in potatoes in the Neth-
; 
erlands is presented below. In fact, this information has been used in order to execute the 
economic model (see also Annex II). 
Fungicides in potatoes in the Netherlands 
Identification of  the pesticide chain 
- Culture: Potatoes in the Netherlands; 
-Type of pesticide: fungicide (protection against Phytophthora infestans) 
-Most important chemical means (together 90%); 
Triphenyltinacetate (Inhibition of important physiological processes, causing death of fungi) 
Mancozeb (blockade of metabolism in fungi by inhibiting enzymes in citric acid cycle) 
Maneb  (blockade of metabolism in fungi by inhibiting ~rtain enzymes in citric acid cycle) 
Fluazinam (inhibition of cell division in fungi) 
-.Type 'pffarms involved:  average size: 42 hectare (LEI-DLO, 1994) 
V plume, prices, costs and environmental risks of  the pesticide used 
- Volume in active ingredients, prices per  kg active ingredients, environmental risks in 7 
categories (see section 4.2) 
Triphen~ tinacetate:  126 ton /year 
MancozE b: 
Maneb:  557 ton /year 
Fluazina 11: 
511  ton /year 
€5 








- Costs of  the pesticides: less than 6% of  the total yield per hectare. 
Potential ppps alternatives 
-Preventive and biological counteraction: use of resistant crops (approximately 50% of the 
farmers involved use these crops), use of untainted seeds and a moderate use of nitrogen. In 
an early stage: killing of the culture.  In  general the use of resistant crops and/or untainted 
seeds will be more expensive for the farmer but at the same time will save him the expendi-
ture for the chemical pesticides_. 
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5.3  Assumptions used to evaluate the effects of an EU wide levy 
Before presenting the results of the pesticide chains, it is important to understand the as-
sumptions which have been  used to evaluate the main economic and environmental ef-
fects  of an  EU  wide  levy.  The assumptions  relate  to the  economic model  used,  to  the 
charge basis, the charge rate,  the price elasticity's of demand and the extent of substitu-
tion and complementary between the pesticides. Below these assumptions will be briefly 
elaborated. 
Model assumptions 
One major assumption of the neo-classical economic model used is the rationality of the  · 
farmer with respect to his use of pesticides. This means that it is assumed that a farmer 
will use pesticides to the point where ~he marginal costs of it equal the marginal benefits. 
Consequently, the economic model  u~ed disregards any possible overuse of pesticides at 
the farm. 
Charge basis 
Basically one can  choo~e between the retail price of the pesticides and  the price of the 
active ingredients of the pesticides, to put a levy on.  Due to a lack of data on  the retail 
prices of the pesticide used  in  the chains,  it was  not possible  to  base  the  levy  on  this 
value.  An  alternative, which is used in  the chains, was to base the levy on  the active in-
gredients of the pesticides. This type of information was available for all pesticide chains. 
Charge rate 
In  the analysis of the  pesticide chains two levy scenarios are distinguished.  In  the first 
scenario all  active ingredients of the pesticides are treated  the  same way.  This  means 
that the levy rate for the various active ingredients are equal, irrespective of possible dif-
ferent environmental hazards. As a first step, for all pesticide chains a 20% levy on active 
ingredients is. assumed. Note that this rate lies between the existing rates in Sweden and 
Denmark. 
In the second scenario the levy on the active ingredients of the pesticides depends on the 
environmental  hazards of these  pesticides.  As described  in  section  4.2,  the  pesticides 
used in agriculture have been classified into seven classes. The rate of the levy is based 
on the following, arbitrary procedure: 
•  the levy on active ingredients of pesticides belonging to the 'middle' classes Ill, IV and 
V is 20% {the environmental effects of these active ingredients are regarded average 
and therefore equal to the levy of the first scenario); 
•  the levy on active ingredients of pesticides belonging in the 'hazardous' classes I or II  · 
is 40%, twice as high as the average levy; 
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VI or VII is 10%, twice as low as the average levy. 
Price elasticity's of  demand 
The economic effects of a levy strongly depend on  the price elasticity of demand of the 
pesticides. Because the economic model focuses on the direct effects of an  EU wide levy 
of pesticides,  a short-term price elasticity of demand  of pesticides  is  assumed.  On  the 
basis of the  studies presented  in  Table 4.1,  the  following  ran~es of price elasticity's of 
demand have been chosen for the different types of pesticides (see Table 5.2). 
Table 5.2  Chosen range of price elasticity's of demand of pesticides: divided by type of pesticide 





low price elasticity of demand  high price elasticity of demand 
-0.4  -0.8 
-0.7  -0.9 
-0.3  -0.8 
In  analysing the effects of an  EU  wide  levy on  pesticides,  for each  pesticide chain  one 
price elasticity of demand was chosen. The following procedure was followed: if there are 
none or only few alternative plant protection devices available in  the pesticide chain the 
low price elasticity was chosen,  if there are many different alternatives available the high 
elasticity was chosen. The underlying reason is simple: by introducing an EU wide levy on 
pesticides possible alternatives will become relatively cheaper, which will lead to a higher 
price elasticity of demand. 
It is as yet unclear whether the above set of price elasticity's of qemand reflect reality. For 
example, one could argue that the studies presented in Table 4.1  are biased towards the 
(typical?) characteristics of the northern Member States of the  European  Union.  On  the 
other hand, one should not disregard the close resemblance across the outcomes of the 
fifteen studies. 
Substitution and complementary between pesticides 
Besides the price elasticity of demand, the effects of an  EU wide levy depend heavily on 
the  extent of substitution  or complementary between  the  pesticides  used  at the  farm. 
Complementary means that the use of one pesticide (active ingredient) has a clear con-
nection with the use of another pesticide (active ingredient). Hence,  in the case of com-
plementary different levies on the active ingredients will have little impact.  In the case of_ 
substitution, a higher levy on one pesticide (active ingredient) will make another pesticide 
(active ingredient) relatively cheaper and more attractive. This will have a positive impact 
on the effects of a differentiated levy. 
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and substitution between the active ingredients for the pesticide chains chosen. Only for 
the _chains  directed to the Netherlands this information could be obtained.  Hence, for the 
remaining pesticide chains assumptions on the extent of complementary and substitution 
had to be made. As a first step, it was assumed that the active ingredients in these pesti-
cide chains are substitutes of each other rather than complements. 
5.4  Results of  the pesticide chains 
5.4.1  Introduction 
In this chapter, for each pesticide chain, the main effects of an EU wide levy on pesticides 
are presented.  The results will  be  pr~sented in  a  pre-determined format,  First,  relevant 
background  information  on  the  pestiCide  chain  is  given.  Second,  the  decisions  on_  the 
price elasticity of demand, substitution and complementary and the two levy scenarios are 
explained. Third,  the economic effects of the levy are displayed and  discussed.  Finally, 
the environmental effects of the levy are presented. Conclusive statements on the results 
of all pesticide chains are given in section 5.5. 
The following economic effects of a levy on pesticides are included in the various Tables: 
•  the change in the use of  pesticides: this change depends on the· rate of the I levy and 
the assumed price elasticity of demand; 
•  the change in pesticide costs:  this change depends on  the change in  the use of the 
pesticides and the rate of the levy; 
•  the change in  total costs: this change depends on the change in  pesticide costs and 
the cost-share of pesticides; 
•  the change in revenues: this change depends on the reve·nues-share of the pesticides 
and the change in the use of pesticides; 
•  the change in  gross margin per. farmer.  this change depends on the change in  total 
revenues, the change in total costs and the number of farms; 
•  revenues of the levy these depend on the rate of the levy, the price of the active in-
gredients and the use of the pesticides. 
5.4.2  Chain 1: Fungicides in lettuce in England and Wales 
Fun_gicides  in the cultivation of lettuce in  England and Wales are used to protect  le~uce 
against mildew. The most important chemical means used by the farmers, are propamo-
carb-hydrocloride (killing of fungi),  fosetyl-aluminium (stimulation of plants' natural resis-
tance), tolclofos-methyl and thiram (blockade of metabolism in fungi). The total usage of 
these active ingredients in the cultivation of lettuce in  England and Wales is 8, 4, 3 and 2 
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the fungicides: i.e., the estimated costs are about 2% of the total yield. 
For this pesticide chain a price elasticity of demand of- 0.4 is assumed. This elasticity is 
at the lower bound (see Table 5.2). It was chosen because the pesticide experts in the UK 
did not report any plant protection alternatives to the use of the above-mentioned active 
ingredients. Moreover, substitution was assumed between the four active ingredients. As 
thiram is regarded very hazardous to the aquatic environment, it was classified with a '1'. 
Hence,  th~ levy  for  this  active  ingredient  was  set  at  40%  instead  of 20%.  Fosetyl-
aluminium and tolclofos-methyl are regarded less hazardous to the environment, conse-
quently the levy for these active ingredients was set at 10%, thereby encouraging a sub-
stitution from thiram t~ fosetyl-aluminium and tolclofos-methyl. 
Table 5.3 presents the economic anq  environmental effects of the two levy scenarios in 
the pesticide chain fungicides in lettuce in England and Wales. 
From this Table one can see that in levy scenario 1 the levy of 20% results in a decrease 
in the use of pesticides of 8%.  Compared to the other pesticide chains this reduction is 
relatively low. Due to the levy the costs of fungicides 'at the farms increase by 10%. Pesti-
cide costs at the farm rise because the decrease in using the fungicides is not enough to 
offset the price increase induced by the levy. The change in total costs is relatively small 
due to a high efficiency of pesticide use (i.e., the low share of pesticides costs). The gross 
margin per farmer reduces by € 148. 
The overall effect of the levy system in scenario 2 is less than in scenario 1. Compared to 
the first scenario, the change in pesticide use increases by 1  %, whereas the costs of pes-
ticides decrease by nearly 2%.The differences can be explained by the lower levy of 10% 
on  two of the four active  ingredients.  Due  to  the  low share of pesticide  costs  in  total 
yields,  there are no  large  differences  between  the  scenarios  with  respect to  the  total 
costs, revenues and gross margin. 
Whereas the economic effects of the levy in the two scenarios are more or less the same, 
this is not the case for the environmental effects. In the first scenario, the four active in-
gredients are reduced  by 8% each. In  the second scenario,  however, the (risky)  activ~ 
ingredient thiram  is  reduced  by  16%,  whereas the active ingredients fosetyl-aluminium 
and  tolclofos-methyl are reduced by 4o/o.  Whereas these changes could be beneficial to 
the ·local and regional environment, it is difficult to choose between the two scenarios as 
the overall impact of scenario 2 is less than scenario 1. 
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Active ingredients  category  use in tons  price I ton 
A. Propamocarb-hydrochloride  Ill  8  €  75,000 
B. Fosetyl-aluminium  VII  4  €  35,000 
C. Tolclofos-methyl  VI  3  €  70,000 
D. Thiram  I  2  €  10,000 
Cost share (pesticides)  2% of total yield 
Assumptions 
Price elasticity of demand  -0.4 
Levy scenario 1  A, 8, C, D : 20% 
I 
Levy scenario 2  .,  A:20%; 8:10%; C:10%; 0:40% 
Economic effects  scenario 1  scenario 2 
Change in use of pesticides  -8.0%  -7.1% 
Change in costs of pesticides  + 10.4%  +8.8% 
Change in total costs  +0.2%  +0.2% 
Change in revenues  -0.2%  -0.1% 
Change in gross margin per farmer  € -148  €  -124 
Revenues of the levy  €  175,000  €  147,000 
Ecological effects  scenario 1  scenario 2 
A. Propamocarb-hydrochloride  -8.0%  -8.0% 
B. Fosetyl-aluminium  -8.0%  -4.0% 
C. Tolclofos-methyl  -8.0%  -4.0% 
D. Thiram  -8.0%  -16.0% 
Source: ElM 
5.4.3  Chain 2: Fungicides in green peppers in Almeria (Spain) 
Alike lettuce, fungicides in the cultivation of green peppers in Almeria (Spain) are used to 
protect the crop against mildew.  The four most important chemical  means used  by  the 
farmers in  Almeria are ethirimol, triflumizole,  pyrifenox and triadimenol.  The total  use of 
these active ingredients in the cultivation of green peppers is 6,  11,  9 and 4 ton  a year, 
respectively.  In  1996 the total area of green peppers in  Almeria was estimated at 7,700 
hectares. The farmers involved have a  relatively  high  efficiency of using  the fungicides: 
i.e., the estimated costs are about 2% of the total yield. 
Just as in the preceding pesticide  c~ain, a price  el~sticity of demand of.- 0.4 is assumed 
here.  This elasticity is  at the  lower bound  (see Table 5.2).  It was chosen  because the 
pesticide experts in Spain did not report any plant protection alternatives to the use of the 
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four active ingredients. Of the acttve ingredients,  pyrifenox is regarded the most hazard-
ous to the environment (cl~ssification II). Hence, the levy for this active ingredient was set 
at 40% in levy scenario 2. As ethirimol is regarded the less hazardous to the environment, 
the levy for this active ingredient was set at 10%,  thus encouraging  a substitution from 
pyrifenox. 
Table 5.4  presents the economic and  environmental effects of the two levy  scenarios in 
the pesticide chain fungicides in green peppers in Almeria. 





Cost share (pesticides) 
Assumptions 
Price elasticity 
Levy scenario 1 
Levy scenario 2 
Economic Effects 
• Change in use of pesticides 
Change in costs of pesticides 
Change in total costs 
Change in revenues 
Change in gross margin per farmer 









'  v 
II 
Ill 





price I ton 
€  7,000 
€  16,000_ 
€  16,000 
€  18,000 
2% of total yield 
-0.4 
A,  B, C.  D: 20% 
A:.10%; B: 20%; C:40%; D 20% 
levy scenario 1  levy scenario 2 
-8.0%  -9.5%  . 
+10.4%  + 12.3% 
+0.2%  +0.2% 
-0.2%  -0.2% 
€  -51  €  -63 
€  79,000  €  96,000 
levy scenario 1  levy scenario 2 
-8.0%  -4.0% 
-8.0%  -8.0% 
-8.0%  -16.0% 
-8.0%  -8.0% 
Alike the pesticide chain on fungicides in lettuce, the levy of 20% results in a decrease in 
the use of pesticides of 8%.  Due to the levy,  and  the low price elasticity of demand, the 
costs of pesticides at the farms  increase by  some 10%.  Pesticide costs at the farm rise 
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induced by the levy. The change in total costs is modest due to a high efficiency of pesti-
cide use. Compared to the first pesticide chain, the change in gross margin per farmer is 
relatively small: € 51. 
The effect of the different levies in scenario 2 on the use of pesticides is greater than in 
scenario 1. Compared to the first scenario, the change in  pesticide use decreases by al-
most 2% whereas the costs of pesticides increases by nearly 2%. These differences can 
be explained by the higher levy of 40% on the acti.ve ingredient pyrifenox. There are no 
differences between the two scenarios with respect to the total costs and revenues. 
In  levy scenario 2 the decrease in  the use of pyrifenox (classification II) is twice as high 
as the decrease in  levy scenario 1. This change will be beneficial to the local and regional 
environment. Together with the  incre~sed overall reduction in the use of pesticides, this 
beneficial change seems to favour the use of a differentiated levy system in the pesticide 
chain 'fungicides in the cultivation of green peppers in Almeria'. 
5.4  .. 4  Chain 3,  4:  Insecticides in cucumbers in England, Wales and the Nether-
lands 
In this section, the two pesticide chains on insecticides in the cultivation of cucumbers are 
taken together. First the results of both pesticide chains will be presented separately, then 
general conclusions will be drawn. 
Insecticides in  the cultivation  of cucumber in  England,  Wales and  the  Netherlands are 
used  to  protect this crop against insects.  The most important chemical  means  used  in 
England and Wales are nicotine,  dichlorvos, fenbutatin and  propoxur. The use of these 
active ingredients is 6.1  ton a year, each. In the Netherlands, dichlorvos, methiocarb and 
methomyl are used. The use of these active ingredients is 3,  1 and 1 ton a year, respec-
tively. Farmers in  England, Wales and the Netherlands have a relatively high efficiency of  , 
using insecticides: i.e., the estimated costs are about 2% of the total yield. 
For both pesticide chains, a price elasticity of demand of- 0.8 is assumed. This elasticity 
lies at the upper bound (see Table 5.2). This elasticity was chosen because the pesticide 
experts in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands  reporte~ various biological crop pro-
tection alternatives, such as using the  ~ite Amb/yseius cucumeris against Thrips tabaci. 
Additional  information from the Netherlands on  the interaction of the active  ingredients 
used in the cultivation of cucumbers indicates that the active ingredients dichorvos, me-
thiocarb and methomyl are substitutes of each other. Consequently, substitution was also 
assumed for the pesticide chain, in England and Wales. Of the six different active ingredi-
ents used in  England, Wales and the Netherlands, three of them are regarded  as very 
hazardou~ to the environment: methomyl, n!cotine and fenbutatin. Consequently, the levy 
for these active ingredient was set at 40% in levy scenario 2. 
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pesticide chain insecticides in cucumbers in England and Wales. 
Table 5.5  Econ~mic  and environmental effects of a levy on insecticides in cucumber in England/ Wales 





Cost share (all active ingredients) 
Assumptions 
Price elasticity 
levy scenario 1 
levy scenario 2 
Economic Effects 
Change in use of pesticides 
Change in costs of pesticides 
Change in total costs 
Change in revenues 
Change in gross margin per farmer 















price I ton 
€  45,000 
€  45,000 
€  230,000 
€  180,000-
2% of total yield 
-0.8 
A, B, C, 0: 20% 
A:.40%; 8: 20%; C: 40%; D 10% 
levy scenario 1  levy scenario 2 
-16.0%  -23.5% 
+0.8%  -2.4% 
+ 0.02%  -0.05% 
-0.3%  -0.5% 
€  -7  €  -9 
€  4,000  €  7,000 
levy scenario 1  levy scenario 2 
-16.0%  -32.0% 
-16.0%  -16.0% 
-16.0%  -32.0% 
-16.0%  -8.0% 
As can be seen  in  this Table,  the levy of 20% results in  a decrease in  the use of pesti-
cides in the cultivation of cucumbers of 16%. Due to the levy·, and the assumed high price 
elasticity of demand, the costs of pesticides at the farms increase ·by  1%. The change in 
total costs, revenues and gross margin is small. 
--
The overall effect of the  different levies  in  scenario 2 on  the  use ·of pesticides  is  50% 
higher than in scenario 1. Compared to the first scenario, the change in pesticide use de-
creases by  7  .5%.  This difference can  be explained by  the  higher levy of 40% on  two of 
the four active ingredients. It is remarkable to see that the cost of pesticides at the farm 
diminishes by  some 2%  due to the price increase.  The underlying reason  for this lies in 
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cross effect- is greater than the summing up of the two effects. The same argumentation 
applies to the (positive) change in total costs (seen from the perspective of the farmer). 
Table 5.6 present the economic and environmental effects of the two levy scenarios in the 
pesticide chain insecticides in cucumbers in the Netherlands. 
Table 5.6. Economic and environmental effects of a levy on insecticides in cucumber in the Netherlands 
Active ingredients fungicides  category  - use in tons  price I ton 
A. Dichlorvos  v  3  €  45,000 
B. Methiocarb  v  1  €  120,000 
C. Methomyl  I  1  €  90,000 
i 
Cost share (pesticides)  .,  2% of total yield 
Assumptions 
•, 
Price elasticity  -0.8 
Levy scenario 1  A, B, C: 20% 
Levy scenario 2  A:.20%; B: 20%; C: 40% 
Economic Effects  levy scenario 1  levy scenario 2 
Change in use of pesticides  -16.0%  -19.0% 
Change in costs of pesticides  +0.8%  -0.5% 
Change in total costs  + 0.02%  -0,01% 
Change in revenues  -0.3%  -0.4% 
Change in gross margin per farmer  €  -299  €- 343 
Revenues of the levy  €  63,000  €  72,000 
Ecological Effects  levy scenario 1  levy scenario 2 
A. Dichlorvos  -16.0%  ,-16.0% 
B. Methiocarb  -16.0%  -16.0% 
C. Methomyl  -16.0%  -32.0% 
Source: ElM 
Alike the situation in England and Wales, the levy of 20% in the cultivation of cucumbers · 
in  the Netherlands result in  a decrease in  the use of the pesticides of 16%.  Due to the 
levy, and the assum~d  high price elasticity of demand, the costs of pesticides at the farms 
increase by  1  o/o.  The change in  total  costs,  revenues and  gross margin  is  again small. 
Yet, the change in gross margin per farmer is substantial when compared to the situation 
in England -and Wales: €  299 versus €  7.  ' 
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ated  levy in  scenario 2 is  higher than in  scenario 1.  Compared to the first scenario, the 
change in  pesticide use decreases by 3%.  The difference can be explained by the higher 
levy  of 40% on  one of the  three active ingredients.  Alike  the situation  in  England  and 
Wales the cost of pesticides at the farm diminishes by some 2% due to the levy. The un-
derlying reason for this result has been explained above. With respect to the other eco-
nomic criteria there are only small differences between the two scenarios. 
In  both  pesticide chains on  fungicides in  the cultivation of cucumbers the differentiated 
levy system resulted in a greater decrease in the overall use of the insecticides as well as 
in  the use of the most hazardous insecticides.  Both  facts favours the use of (different) 
levies based on the environmental. hazards of the insecticides. More generally, the close 
similarities in  these  pesticide chains  ~uggest that the  outcomes  may  be  generalised to 
some higher level of aggregation. In this case, the results may be generalised up to the 
case of insecticides in the cultivation of cucumbers in the European Union, and hopefully 
to the use of  insecticide~ in the horticultural sector of the Community. 
5.4.5  Chain 5, 6: Fungicides in potatoes in Sweden and the Netherlands 
In  this  section,  the two pesticide chains on  fungicides  in  the cultivation  of potatoes are 
taken together. First the results of both pesticide chains will be presented separately, then 
general conclusions will be drawn. 
Fungicides in the cultivation of potatoes in Sweden and the Netherlands are used to pro-
tect this crop against Phytophthora infestans, causing potato disease. The most important  . 
chemical means used in Sweden are fluazinam and mancozeb. The usage of these active 
ingredients is 26 and 39 ton a year,  respectively.  In  the Netherlands four active ingredi-
ents are used: triphenyltinetate, mancozeb, mane and fluazinam. The usage of these ac-
tive ingredients is  126, 511,  557 and  115 ton  a year,  respectively.  Farmers  in  Sweden 
have a higher efficiency of using fungicides in  potatoes than farmers in Netherlands: the 
estimated costs of the pesticides are about 2% and 5% of the total yield, respectively. 
In both pesticide chains a price elasticity of demand of- 0.8 is assumed. This elasticity is 
at the upper bound (see Table 5.2). It was chosen because the pesticide experts in Swe-
den and the Netherlands reported various crop protection alternatives to the use of fungi-
cides,  such as the use of uninfected  ~eeds, the use of resistant crops,  the use of unat-
tained seeds, and the killing of the culture in  an  early stage.  Additional information from 
the Netherlands on the interaction of the active ingredients used in  the cultivation of po-
tatoes indicates that two of the active ingredients used by the farmers are complementary 
to  each other:  triphenyltinetate and  maneb.  In  other words,  a reduction  in  one of these 
active ingredients is accompanied by  the  sa_me  reduction  in  the other active ingredient. 
Because the farmers in SWeden  use the other two active ingredients of the Netherlands -
fluazinam and mancozeb -,  it was reasonable to assume substitution there.  Of the four 
·different active ingredients used only triphenyltinetate is regarded very hazardous to the 
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in levy scenario 2. 
I able 5. 7 present the economic and environmental effects of the two levy scenarios in the 
pesticide chain fungicides in potatoes in Sweden. 
Table 5.7 Economic and environmental effects of a levy on fungicides in potatoes in Sweden 
r---
Active ingredients fungicides 
A. Fluazinam 
B. Mancozeb 
Cost share (pesticides) 
Assumptions 
Price elasticity 
Levy scenario 1 
Levy scenario 2 
Economic Effects 
Change in use of pesticides 
Change in costs of pesticides 
Change in total costs 
Change in revenues 
Change in gross margin per farmer 








use in tons 
26 
39 
price I ton 
€  120,000 
€  30,000 
2% of total yield 
-0.8 
A, B: 20% 
A:.20%; B: 10% 
levy scenario 1  levy scenario 2 
-16.0%  -11.2% 
+0.8%  +0.9% 
+ 0.02%  + 0.02% 
-0.3%  -0.3% 
€  -51  €  -44 
€  712,000  €  622,000 
levy scenario 1  levy scenario 2 
-16.0%  -16.0% 
-16.0%  -8.0% 
As can be seen in Table 5.7, the levy of 20% results in a decrease in the use of pesticides 
in the cultivation of potatoes of 16%. Due to the levy and the assumed high price elasticity 
of demand the costs of pesticides at the farm slightly increases by 1  o/o.  The change in 
total costs is small due to the high efficiency of pesticide use. The change in gross margin 
per farmer is €  51. 
In the second levy scenario, the impact of the levy on the use of fungicides in the cultiva-
tion of potatoes is 11 %,  less than the reduction in scenario 1. The reason is fact that one 
of the two active ingredients in this scenario has a levy of 10% instead of 20%. The influ-
ence on the other economic parameters is almost the same as in the first levy scenario. 
ElM  I Haskoning  55 T~ble 5.8 presents the economic and environmental effects of the two levy scenarios in 
the pesticide chain fungicides in potatoes in the Netherlands. 
T. able 5.8 Economic and environmental effects of a levy on fungicides in potatoes in the Netherlands  .. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~==~~~~~~=~~-------





Cost share (pesticides) 
Assumptions 
Price elasticity 
Levy scenario 1 
Levy scenario 2 
Economic Effects 
Change in use of pesticides 
Change in costs of pesticides 
Change in total costs 
Change in revenues 
Change in gross margin per farmer 
















price I ton 
€  40,000 
€  7,000 
€  5,000 
€  90,000 
5% of total yield 
-0.8 
A, 8, C, D : 20% 
A: 40%; 8: 1  0%; C: 20%; D 20% 
levy scenario 1  levy scenario 2 
-16%  -18.3% 
+0.8%  -0.2% 
+ 0.05%  -0.01% 
-1.0%  -1.1% 
€  -365  €  -396 
€  3,654,000  €  3,964,000 
levy scenario 1  levy scenario 2 
-16.0%  -26.0% 
-16.0%  ·-8.0% 
-16.0%  -26.0% 
-16.0%  -16.0% 
Just as in the pesticide chain on fungicides in potatoes in Sweden, the levy of 20% results 
in a decrease in the use of pesticides of 16%. Due to the levy and the assumed high price 
elasticity of demand the costs of pesticides at the farm  slightly  increases by  1  %.  The 
change  in  total  costs  is  almost zero  due  to  the  high  efficiency  of pesticide  use.  The 
change in· gross margin per farmer is much higher than  in  the case of Sweden:  €  365 
versus €  51. Hence, these outcomes clearly show that the same levy for the same type of 
pesticide used in the same type of crop could have diffe_rent effects to farmers in different 
regions. 
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In contrast to the situation in Sweden, the overall effect of a differentiated levy system on 
the use .of fungicides in  potatoes is higher than in  scenario 1.  Compared to the first sce-
nario, the change in pesticide use decreases by 2%. This difference can be explained by 
the higher levy of 40% on triphenyltinetate and the accompanied reduction in maneb due 
to their complementary (and despite the fact that the levy on  maneb is 20o/o).The costs of 
pesticides in scenario 2 diminish by 0.2%. The underlying reason for this lies again in the 
fact that the (~egative) cross product of the volume and price effect of the levy- the cross 
effect - is somewhat greater than the summi_!1g up of the two separate effects. Finally, it is 
worth noting that the revenues of a levy on  potatoes in  the Netherlands are quite high, 
about €  4 million. This is because many farmers in Holland cultivate potatoes. 
From an environmental point of view, it is difficult to provide a clear statement on the two 
levy scenarios. In Sweden, the undiff«rrentiated levy system results in a greater decrease 
in the use of pesticides than the  differenti~ted scenario. This is because the active ingre-
dients involved are not considered very hazardous to the environment.  Hence, they are 
levied too much in the first levy scenario. For the Netherlands, it is tempting to conclude 
that a differentiated levy system should be used above an undifferentiated system. How-
ever,  one should take into account that the results are positively influenced  by  the fact 
that the most hazardous pesticide - triphenyltinetate - is complementary to another less 
, hazardous pesticide:  maneb.  More generally,  it seems that information  on  the comple-
mentary and substitution of the active ingredients is crucial in getting a satisfactory notion 
of the effects- economic and environmental- of an  EU wide levy on  pesticides. Unfortu-
nately, this information is not easy tp obtain. 
5.4.6  Chain 7: Herbicides in corn in the Netherlands 
Herbicides in the cultivation of corn in the Netherlands are used to protect the crop from 
weeds. The three most important chemical m_eans used by the farmers are atrazin, bento-
zon ana pyridate. The use of these active ingredients is  154,  100 and 57 ton a year,  re-
spectively. Compared to the other pesticide chains, the. farmers involved have a relatively 
poor efficiency of using the pesticides: i.e., the estimated costs are a_bout 6% of the total 
yield. 
In this pesticide chain a price elasticity of demand of- 0.9 is assumed. This elasticity is at 
the  upper bound  (see Table 5.2).  It was  chosen  because  the  pesticide  experts in  the 
Netherlands reported various crop protection alternatives, such as mechanical weed con-
trol14.  Additional information from the Netherlands on the interaction of the active ingredi-
14  Mechanical weed control  in  corn  is gaining' importance.  In  199S mechanical weed control was applied  at 
about 26% of the area used for corn cultivation. This was caused by stimulation of specialised equipment 
for this crop (weed harrow). A 100% mechanical treatment of the field, however, is often practically impos-
sible to  perform, due to the fact that the timing of such activity is extremely important and that the farmer 
often hires some contract workers to do the job.  The combination of an  exact timing of mechanical weed 
control, a perfectly prepared crop field and the time schedule of contract workers appears to be impossible 
in  practice.  Therefore at present growing  interest exists for the combination  of mechanical weed  control 
(weed harrow, two times) before the rise of corn plants, and chemical treatment (in low doses) directly after 
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farmers are complementary to each other: atrazin and  pyridate. Atrazin is also regarded 
the most hazardous of the three active ingredients: i.e., seen from the environmental point 
of view. Pyridate is much less hazardous to the environment. Due to their complementary, 
it is difficult to stimulate a substitution between these two active ingredients. 
Table 5.9·presents the economic and environmental effects of the two levy scenarios in 
the pesticide chain herbicides in corn in the Netherlands. 
Table 5.9 Economic and environmental effects of a levy on herbicides in corn in the Netherlands 
Active ingredients fungicides  category  use in tons  price I ton 
A. Atra,zin  II  . 154  €  10,000 
B. Bentazon  Jll. 
;  100  €  35,000 
C. Pyridate  VII  57  €  55,000 
Cost share (pesticides)  6% of total yield 
Assumptions 
Price elasticity  -0.9 
Levy scenario 1  A,  B, C: 20% 
Levy scenario 2  A:40%; 8:20%; C: 10% 
Economic Effects  levy scenario 1  levy scenario 2 
Change in use of pesticides  -18%  -18% 
Change in costs of pesticides  -1.6%  -1,6% 
Change in total costs  -0.1%  -0.1% 
Change in revenues  -1.0%  -1.0% 
Change in gross margin per farmer  €  -267  €  -267 
Revenues of the levy  €  1,337,000  €  1,335,000 
Ecological Effects  levy scenario 1  levy scenario 2 
A. Atrazin  -18.0%  -18.0% 
B  .. Bentazon  -18.0%  -18.0% 
c.-Pyridate  -18.0%  -18.0% 
Source: ElM 
Due to the assumed hjgh price elasticity of demand, the levy of 20% results in a decrease 
in the use of pesticides of 18%. The costs of pesticides in  scenario 1 diminish by almost 
2%. The underlying reason for this lies in  the high cross effect of the volume and  price 
rise:  integrated pesticide management. This integrated pesticide management in corn not only results  in  a 
higher  crop yield per hectare but also reduces the costs per hectare up to €  40  per ha  compared to the 
traditional chemical treatment in advised doses. 
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the farmer. The change in gross margin is, however, negative: minus €  267. 
Because of the complementary between atrazin and pyridate, the outcomes of the second 
levy scenario are identical to the outcomes of the  firs~ scenario.  In  fact,  the high  levy of 
40o/o on atrazin is counterbalanced by the low levy of 10% on pyridate. 
5.4.  7  Chain 8: Herbicides in winter barley in England and Wales 
Herbicides in the cultivation of winter barley in England and Wales are used to protect the· 
crop from weeds. The four most important chemical means used  by the farmers are iso-
proturon,  pendimethalin,  mecoprop and  tri-allate.  The use of these active ingredients  is 
719,  125,  82,  68 ton  a year,  respectively.  Compared  to  the  other pesticide chains,  the 
farmers  involved  have a relatively  poor efficiency of using  the  herbicides:  i.e.,  the esti-
mated costs are about 5% of the total yield. 
In this pesticide chain a price elasticity of demand of- 0. 7 is assumed. This elasticity is at 
the  lower bound  (see  Table  5.2).  It was  chosen  because  the  pesticide  experts  in  the 
United Kingdom did  not report any  crop protection alternatives to the use of pesticides. 
Moreover, substitution was assumed between the four active ingredients as  no  informa-
tion on this topic was available. Of the active ingredients, pendimethalin and  isoproturon 
are regarded the most hazardous to the environment (classification I and II,  respectively). 
Hence, the levies for these active ingredients were set at 40% in  levy scenario 2.  Since 
mecoprop is regarded less hazardous to the environment, the levy for this active ingredi-
ent was set at 10%, encouraging a substitution from pendimethalin and isoproturon. 
Table 5.10 presents the economic and environmental effects of the two levy scenarios in 
the pesticide chain herbicides in winter barley in England and Wales. 
From this Table it can  be  seen  that in  levy scenario 1 the  levy of 20% results  in  a de-
crease_ in  the use of pesticides of 14%.  Due to  this  levy the  costs  of pesticides at the 
farms_ increase by  3%.  Pesticide costs rise because the decrease in using the fungicides 
is not enough to offset the price increase induced by the levy. The changes in total costs, 
revenues and gross margin per farmer are relatively small, however. 
The overall effect of the differentiated levy in scenario 2 on the use of pesticides is much 
higher tha_n  in scenario 1. Compared to the first scenario,  t~e change in pesticide use de-
creases by  11 o/.o  whereas the costs of pesticides at the farm decreases only by  2%. The 
differences can be explained by the higher levy of 40% on two of the four active ingredi-
ents. Due to the low share of pesticide costs in total yields, there are no large differences 
between the two scenarios with respect to the total costs, revenues and gross margin. 
Whereas the economic effects of the two levy scenarios are more or less the same, this is 
not the case for the Emvironmel"!tal effects. In the first scenario, all four active ingredients 
are reduced by  14o/o.  In the second scenario, the risky active ingredients isoproturon and 
pendimethalin are reduced by 28%, whereas the less risky active ingredient mecoprop is 
/ 
ElM  I Haskoning  59 reduced  by  7%.  These  changes  are  beneficial to the  local  and  regional  environment. 
Hence,  for this particular pesticide chain  a differentiated  levy  system seems to  be  pre-
ferred over an ordinary levy system. 
Table 5 10 Economic and environmental effects of a levy on herbicides in winter barley in England/Wales 
Active ingredients fungicides  category  use in tons  price I ton 
A. lsoproturon  II  719  €  12,000 
B. Pendimethalin  I  125  €  28,000 
-
C. Mecoprop  VII  82  €  10,000 
D. Tri-allate  v  68  €  17,000 
Cost share (pesticides)  5% of total yield 
i 
Assumptions 
Price elasticity  -0.7 
Levy scenario 1  A, B, C, D: 20% 
Levy scenario 2  A:.40%; B: 40%; C:10%; q: 20% 
Economic Effects  levy scenario 1  levy scenario 2 
Change in use of pesticides  -14.0%  -25.3% 
Change in costs of pesticides  +3.2%  + 1.1% 
Change in total costs  +0.2%  +0.1% 
Change in revenues  -0.7%  -1.3% 
Change in gross margin per farmer  €  -23  €- 36 
Revenues of the levy  €  2,428,000  €  3,771,000 
Ecological Effects  levy scenario 1  levy scenario 2 
A. lsoproturon  - 14.0%  -28.0% 
B. Pendimethalin  -14.0%  -28.0% 
C. Mecoprop  -14.0%  -7.0% 
D. Tri-allate  -14.0%  -14.0% 
Source: ElM 
· 5.4.8  Chain 9: Fungicides in winter w~eat  in Sweden 
Fungicides  in  the  ~ultivation of winter wheat  in  Sweden  are  used  to  protect  the  crop 
against leaf and  ear diseases  (rust,  mildew).  The two  most important chemical  means 
used by the farmers are fenpropimorf and propiconazol. The usage of these active ingre-
dients is 54 and 28 ton  a year,  respectively. The farmers involved have a relatively poor 
efficiency of using the pesticides: te., the estimated costs are about 4% of the total yield. 
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the upper bound (see Table 5.2). It was chosen because the pesticide experts in Sweden 
reported  various crop protection alternatives:  crop  rotation,  use of resistant strains  and 
the use of uninfected seeds. Substitution was assumed between the two active ingredi-
ents as no additional information on  this topic was available.  Both active ingredients are 
regarded  hazardous to  the  environment (classification  II).  Consequently,  the  levies  for 
these active ingredients were set at 40% in levy scenario 2. 
Table 5.11  presents the economic and environmental effects of the two levy scenarios in 
the pesticide chain on fungicides in winter wheat in Sweden. 
Table 5.11  Economic and environmental effects of a levy on fungicides in winter wheat in Sweden 
Active ingredients  ~tegory  use in tons  price I ton 
1----~-----------......;--=~--··-----.. ----------.!--------l 
A. Fenpropimorf  II ' 
B. Propiconazol  II 
Cost share (pesticides) 
Assumptions 
Price elasticity 
Levy scenario 1 
Levy scenario 2 
Economic Effects 
Change in use of pesticides 
Change in costs of  pesticide~ 
Change in total costs 
Change in revenues. 
Change in gross margin per farmer 







€  40,000 
€  240,000 
4% of total yield 
-0.8 
A, B: 20% 
A:.40%; B: 40% 
levy scenario 1  levy scenario 2 
- 16.0%  -32.0% 
+0.8%  +4,8% 
+ 0.03%  -0.2% 
-0.6%  -1.3% 
€  -72  €  - 117 
€  1,476,000  €  2,389.,000 
levy scenario 1  levy scenario 2 
-16.0%  -32.0% 
-16.0%  -32.0% 
This Table shows that the levy of 20% in  levy scenario 1 results in a decrease in the use 
of pesticides of 16%. Due to the levy and the assumed high price elasticity of demand the 
costs of pesticides at the farms increases only  by  1  %.  Pesticide costs rise because the 
decrease in using the fungicides is not enough to offset the price increase induced by the 
levy.  The changes  in  total  costs,  revenues  and  gross  margin  per farmer are  relatively 
small in this ·scenario. 
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on the use of pesticides in this scenario is also twice as high as the effects in scenario 1: 
32% versus 16%. Due to the _high  levy· and the assumed high price elasticity of demand 
the costs of pesticides in  scenario 2 diminish by almost 5%.  The underlying reason for 
this lies in the high cross effect of the volume and price effect of the levy. Also the change 
in total costs is positive, seen from the perspective of the farmer. The change in revenues 
and the change in  gross margin  are  negative.  The revenues of the  levy  in  the second 
scenario are of course much higher than in the first scenario: €  1.5 million versus €  2.4 
million. 
The environmental effects of the second scenario are much better than those of the first 
scenario.  Due to the fact that both active ingredients are considered very hazardous to 
the environment and are therefore lev_ied  by 40%, it is difficult to speak of a differentiated 
; 
levy system. 
5.4.9  Chain 10: Herbicides in public pavements and roads in the Netherlands 
Besides the use of herbicides  in  agriculture these  pesticides are also  used  to  prevent 
public pavements and roads from destruction of weeds. This feature of herbicides forms 
the  topic of the  last pesticide  chain  evaluated  in  this  study.  The  four  most  important 
chemical  means are diuron,  glyfosate,  amitrol  and  simazin.  The  usage of these active 
ingredients by the Dutch municipalities is 11,  10, 2 and 0.5 ton a year,  respectively. The 
general'  costs of weed treatment on  public pavements and roads are estimated at €  0.05 
per m2, which corresponds to a cost share of about 2% of the variable costs. 
In this pesticide chain a price elasticity of demand of- 0.9 is assumed. This elasticity is at 
the  upper bound  (see Table 5.2).  It was  chosen  because the  pesticide experts  in  the 
Netherlands reported four alternative crop protection devices to the use of herbicides: 
•  selective spraying by means of advanced equipment (with sensors); 
•  mechanical removal (brushing): 
•  physical removal (burning): 
•  ··physical removal (steam): 
Additional information on the interaction of the active Ingredients used in  the weed treat-
ment of public pavements and roads indicates that the four active ingredients are substi-
tutes from each other.  Of these active ingredients,  diuron and amitrol are  regarded  the 
most hazardous for the environment (classification  II).  Glyfosate and  simazin,  however, 
are regarded less hazardous to the environment (classification IV).  By using a differenti-
ated levy system substitution between the various pesticides will be stimulated. 
Table 5.12 presents the economic  and environmental effects of the two levy scenarios· in 
the pesticide chain on herbicides in public pavements and roads in the Netherlands. 
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Active ingredients fungicides  category  use in tons  price I ton 
A. Diuron  II  11  €  13,500 
B. Glyfosate  Ill  10  €  89,000 
C. Amitrol.  II  2  €  89,000 
D. Simazin  Ill  0.5  €  9,000 
Cost share (pesticides)  2% of variable costs 
Assumptions 
Price elasticity 
I  -0.9 
Levy scenario 1  A, B, C, D : 20% 
Levy scenario 2  i  A: 40%; B: 20%; C: 40%; D: 20%  ., 
Economic Effects  levy scenario 1  levy scenario 2 
Change in use of pesticides  -18.0%  -27.9% 
Change in costs of pesticides  -1.6%  -3.9% 
Change in total costs  -0.1%  -0.2% 
Change in revenues per m2  -1.1%  -1.4% 
Change in gross margin per m2  €  -28  €  -32 
Revenues of the levy  €  193,000  €  221,000 
Ecological Effects  levy scenario 1  levy scenario 2 
A. Diuron  -18.0%  -36.0% 
B.  Glyfosate  -18.0%  -18.0% 
C. Amitrol  -18.0%  -36.0% 
D. Simazin  -18.0%  -18.0% 
Source: ElM 
From this Table it can  be seen that the levy of  20% in  levy  scenario 1 results  in  a de-
crease in the use of pesticides of 18o/o.  Due to the levy and the assumed high price elas-
ticity of demand the costs of pesticides at the farms diminish by 2%. The changes in  tot~l 
costs, revenu.es and gross margin per m
2 are again small in this scenario. 
In  the second levy scenario,  the levy has more impact. A reduction  in  the  use of herbi-
cides is established of 28%. The main reason for this are the higher levies which are ap-
·plied on the active ingredients diuron and amitrol (40% instead of 20%). The costs of pes-
ticides per m2  diminish by almost 4% (due to a high cross effect) and the ch?nge in total 
costs by 0.2%. The revenues of the differentiated levy are estimated at €  221,000. 
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other Member States of the ·European Union, as the assumptions, treatments and chemi-
cal means are not specific for the Netherlands. 
5.5  Conclusions 
Before drawing the most relevant conclusions of the pesticide chains, Table 5.13 presents 
an overview of the key outcomes ofthe analyses  .. 
Table 5.13  Overview of the key outcomes of the pesticide chains 
Pest~cide chains  change in use of  change in total  change in gross margin 
pesticides  costs  per farmer (in Etiro) 
~ 
scenario 1  s¢enario 2  scenario 1  scenario 2  scenario 1  scenario 2 
1.  fungicides in lettuce in  -8%  -7%  +0.2%  +0.2%  -148  -124 
England and Wales 
2.  fungicides in green pep- -8%  -10%  +0.2%  +0.2%  -51  -63 
pers in Almeria 
3.  insecticides in cucumbers  -16%  -24%  + 0.02%  -0.05%  -7  -9 
in England and Wales 
4.  insecticides in cucumbers  -16%  -·19%  +0.02%  -0.01%  -299  -343 
in the Netf¥3rlands 
5.  fungicides in potatoes in  -16%  -11%  + 0.02%  + 0.02%  -51  -44 
Sweden 
6.  fungicides in potatoes in  -16%  -18%  +0.05%  -0.01%  -365  -396 
the Netherlands 
7.  herbicides in com in the  -18%  -18%  -0.1%  -0.1%  -267  -267 
Netherlands 
8.  herbicides in winter barley  -14%  -25%  +0.2%  + 0.1%  -23  -36 
in England and Wales 
9.  fungicides in winter wheat  :.16%  -32%  + 0.03%  -0.2%  -72  -117 
in Sweden 
1  O;  herbicides in public pave- -18%  -28%  -0.1%  -0.2%  -28  -32 
ments in the Netherlands 
General mean<•>  -14%  -18%  + 0.1%  + 0.02%  -143  - 155 
{a)  The general means have been calculated on the basis of the first nine pesticide chains. 
Source: ElM 
From this Table it can be seen that the decrease in the  u~e of the pesticides lies between 
8%  and  18%  f~r the first levy  scenario,  and  between  7%  an~ 32%  for the  second  levy 
scenario. The increase in total costs .at the farms due to the levy lies between+ 0.2% and 
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scenario. Finally,, the decrease in gross margin per farmer lies between € 7 and € 365 for 
the first scenario and between € 9 and € 396 for the differentiated levy scenario. On aver-
age,  the latter scenario has a greater impact on  the income of the farmers:  €  155 Euro 
versus € 143 Euro in the first scenario. 
The first conclusion which can be drawn on the basis of the outcomes is that a 20% levy 
on pesticides has a substantial impact on the use of pesticides in agriculture. From Table 
5.13  a  mean de.crease  (excluding  the  pesticide  chain  on  public  pavements) was com-
puted of 14% for scenario 1 and 18% ~f scenario 2. 
It should be noted that the reduction  in  the use of pesticides Is  somewhat biased to the 
positive side due to the frequently used assumption that the active ingredients are sub-
stitutes from each other. On the other  ~and, the reduction might be biased to the negative 
side as sometimes no alternatives to the use of pesticides were reported. This has led to 
a price elasticity which was at the lower bound in Table 5.2. In order to get a more reliable 
overview of the effectiveness of an EU  wide levy more information on these two aspects 
should be gathered for the Member States. For example, in the chains for the Netherlands 
it was shown that additional information on the complementary between the active ingre-
dients could have a substantial influence on the effects of the levy: i.e., compare the out-
comes in the second levy scenario of pesticide chains no. 5 and 6. 
The second conclusion which can be drawn on the basis of the outcomes is that the pro-
posed differentiated levy system (10%, 20% and 40%) has a greater beneficial impact on 
the  environment than  the  levy  system  which  uses  one  overall  levy  (20%)  (see  Table 
5.13). 
Whereas it is tempting to propose such a differentiated levy system for the European Un-
ion, it should be noted that the classification used in this study is not undisputed. On the 
one hand, the classification only relates to the effects of the pesticides to the aquatic envi-
ronment, on the other hand, for many pesticides it is still unknown what the precise effects 
to the environment are, especially in the. long-term. More research on this topic is needed 
before a differentiated levy system can be actually implemented. 
· The  third conclusion which can be drawn on  the basis of the outcomes is that the eco-
nomic effects ofan EU wide levy of 20% are limited. From Table 5.13 a mean increase of 
the total costs (excluding the pesticide chain on public pavements) was computed of 0.1% 
for scenario 1 and 0.02% of scenario 2. 
These effects are somewhat biased to the positive side due to a high efficiency in the use 
of the pesticides in the pesticide chains selected. Note that in some cases the total costs 
of a levy on  pesticides even decrease (see,  for example,  pesticide chain  no .7  in  Table 
5.13).  The underlying reason for this results relates to a high price elasticity of demand 
(due to many alternative plant protection devices) combined with  a substantial negative 
cross effect of the induced volume and price changes of the levy. 
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margin per farmer differs largely across the pesticide chains (see Table 5.13): from € 7 in 
England and Wales (levy scenario 1 in pesticide chain 3) to € 396 in the Netherlands (levy 
scenario 2  in  pesticide chain 6).  Nevertheless, the mean decrease in  gross margin be-
tween the two scenarios is small:  € 143 versus € 155. 
It should  be noted that these  income  reductions  have  been  calculated  without a  reim-
bursement of the revenues.  By  using an  effective re-allocation ·of the revenues the  re-
ported decrease in gross margin should b~ reduced. 
The  fifth  conclusion which can be drawn on the basis of the outcomes is that the· differ-
ences in  environmental effects are substantial across the  pesticide chains when  com-
pared to the differences in  economic effects. An important explanation relates to the dif-
ferent price elasticity's on demand. By using a high price elasticity of demand, important 
eff~cts on the use of pesticides are realised.  Becal:'se of the high efficiency in  using the 
pesticides in  agriculture - i.e.,  the estimated cost-shares in  the nine pesticide chains lie 
between 2% and 6% - the economic effects of a high price elasticity of demand is largely 
neutralised. 
The sixth conclusion which can be drawn on the basis of the outcomes is that the results 
of pesticide chains cannot be simply generalised to some higher level. Although the out-
comes in the pesticide chains on  insecticides in cucumbers seem to imply that these re-
sults  could  be  generalised  to  some  higher level  of aggregation  (to  horticulture  in  the 
European Union?), the outcomes in the pesticide chains on fungicides in potatoes clearly 
show that the same levy for the same· type of pesticide used  in  the same type of crop 
could have large different effects to farmers in different regions. 
Again, more research on this topic is needed in order to be able to draw more useful con-
clusions on the potentiality of pesticide chains to  generali~e the outcomes from one pesti-
cide chain to another. 
Finally, it should be emphasised that the outcomes presented in Table 5.13 depend heav-
ily on the assumptions stated in  section 5.2.  Most probably, other levy scenario's, other 
. price elasticity's of demand and other assumptions on the extent of substitution or com-
plementary between the pesticides will result in other values. 
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6  The contours of an  EU wide regulatory framework for 
levies on pesticides 
6.1  Introduction 
This chapter presents a charcoal sketch of a European Union wide regulatory framework 
for  levies  on  pesticides.  That is,  for  several  consequential  elements  of the  regulatory 
framework, such as the charge base and the allocation of revenues, explicit propositions 
will be put forward. Yet,  as the contemporary information on  the regulation of pesticides 
by means of market-based instruments is too fragmented and_ brittle, it is not possible to 
draw the many details of the regulatory ·framework. In other words, a blueprint for a Euro-
pean Union wide regulatory framework on the taxation of pesticides, alike the one on en-
ergy products, cannot be designed yet. 
In  choosing  the  major  consequential  elements  of  a  European  Union  wide  regulatory 
framework for levies on pesticides, the existing Directive on the taxation of energy (Direc-
tives 91/12/EEC ·and  92/81/EEC) was  used as a guideline.  on· the basis of Article 1 to 
Article 26 of this  European  environmental  legislation,  the  following  important elements 
have been selected: 
•  the products involved; 
•  the charge base; 
•  the charge rate; 
•  the imposition points; 
•  the allocation of revenues. 
Below,  in Table 6.1, four of these consequential elements have been put together. As for 
each  element  several  alternatives  are  available,  many  variations  exist  in  sketching  a 
charcoal of a European Union wide regulatory framework for levies oh pesticides. For ex-
ample, from Table 6.1  it can be seen that the charge base of a levy on pesticides can be 
put on the hazards the pesticides cause to the environment, on the value of the pesticides 
(retail  or wholesale price) or on  the active ingredients of the  pesticides.  Moreover,  the 
charge base selected cc;>uld  hold for all kinds of pesticides or could be differentiated to the 
different types of pesticides. 
A  similar variety of options  is  available  for the  charge  rate  (e.g.  fixed  rates,  minimum 
rates,  differentiated  rates),  the  imposition  points. (e.g.  industry,  wholesalers,  retailers, 
farmers) and  institutions and  targets to refund  the· revenues (e.g.  European  Union,  indi-
vidual Member States,  agricultural sector,  farmers involved, ·deficit reduction,  supporting 
R&D). 
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Charge  Imposition  Refunding of revenues 
base  rate  points  organisation  target 
environmental hazards  fixed  industry  EU  CAP 
wholesale price  minimum  wholesalers  Member States  deficit reduction 
reta}l price  differentiated  retailers  agricultural sector  direct payments per he:ctare; 
active ingredients  farmers  crop premiums, innovation 
programs for industry 
general, specific  high, medium, low  farmers involved  supporting environmental plant 
protection measures 
Source: ElM 
Table 6.1  exhibits  that many  EuropJan  Union  wide  regulatory  frameworks  can  be  de-
signed  in  combining  the different charge bases, .  the different charge rates,  the different 
imposition point systems and different allocations of revenues. For illustrative purposes, a · 
subset of the possibilities are presented in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2  Some possible European Union wide regulatory frameworks on pesticides 
System A  System B  System C 
•  charge base: retail price  •  charge base: retail price  •  charge base: active ingredients 
•  charge rate: minimum (medium)  •  charge rate: fixed (high)  •  charge rate: minimum (low) 
•  imposition: retailers  •  imposition: farmers  ·•  imposition: industry 
•  revenues: direct payments per  •  revenues: agricultural R & D  •  revenues: CAP 
hectare 
System 0  System E  System F 
•  charge base: env. risk  •  charge base: env. risk  •  charge base: wholesale price 
•  charge rate: fixed (high)  •  charge rate: fixed (medium)  •  charge rate: differentiated 
•  imposition: wholesalers  •  imposition: industry  - •  imposition: wholesalers 
•  revenues: supporting environ- •  revenues: crop premiums  •  revenues: support for inte-
mental plant protection measures  grated pesticide management 
Source: ElM 
The many options for designing an EU wide regulatory framework for levies on  pesticides 
need to be ranked in order to select a best working system. On behalf of this, four criteria 
have been defined on which the possible frameworks will be evaluated. The criteria were 
established by noting that an  ideal EU  wide regulatory framework on  pesticides, at least, 
should be: 
•  environmentally effective; 
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•  acceptable for all those concerned; 
•  easy to accomplish. 
In  the next five sections the above-mentioned consequential elements will be dealt with 
separately (section 6.2 to ·6.6).  In each section, first the available options are presented, 
after which these options are evaluated against the criteria defined ab_pve.  These judge-
ments are partly based on the information presented in chapters 2,  3 and 4,  partly based 
on the outcomes of the pesticide chains_ in chapter 5, and partly based on a review'  of new 
literature. At the end of each section clear proposals will be presented. Finally, on  ~he ba-
sis of these proposals, a charcoal sketch of an  EU  wide regulatory framework for levie.s 
on pesticides is presented in section d. 7. 
6.2  The products involved in the regulatory framework 
It is important to define clearly which products fall under the framework.  For example,  in 
Article 2 of the Council Directive on the taxation of energy products a precise list of prod-
ucts is specified, together with their 'CN-codes'. 
With respect to the EU wide regulatory framework on pesticides, there are many possibili-
ties. For example, the framework can be directed to all (registered) pesticides used in the 
agricultural sector of the European Union,  or it can  be  directed to only  those pesticides 
which are used  in  arable farming,  horticulture,  etceteras.  It can  also be  directed to the 
pesticides used in meaningful water-collection areas or nature reserves. Another possibil-
ity is to direct the framework to the most risky  pesticides,  for example,  those pesticides 
which were classified with a 'I' or 'II' in  the pesticide chains.  In  Table 6.3 the above op-
tions are evaluated against the cri~eria defined in section 6. 1. 
In this Table a./ is used to denote that the option scores satisfactory towards the criteria. 
·When possible a distinction is made between the options from ./(most) to ./(least). 
Table 6.3  Four options with respect to the products involved in the EU wide regulatory framework · 
Options  Env. effect.  Eas  toaccom.  Acceptable  Ec: efficient 
•  all (registered) pesticides used  ~(most)  ~  ~  ~ 
in the agricultural sector 
•  all pesticides used in arable  ~  ~  ~(least)  ~ 
farming 
•  all pesticides used in  meaning- ~  ~(least) 
ful water-collection areas 
•  only the  most risky pesticides  ~  ~(least) 
Source: ElM 
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options are feasible. However, compared to the other option~. restricting the framework to 
all (registered) pesticides in the agricultural sector of the European Union is certainly the 
most effective.  Directing the framework to only the most risky  pesticides or to the pesti-
cides used in meaningful water-collection areas are sub-optimal. As these two options are 
also very difficult to accomplish, they have not been evaluated further in Table 6.3. 
With respect to the remaining two options, the acceptability of directing the framework to 
all-{ registered) pesticides will be higher than the option which focuses solely on the pesti-
cide used in arable farming (or another sector within agriculture). Regarding the economic 
efficiency of the two options, there s~em  to be no major differences. 
Consequently~ on the basis of the evaluation presented in Table 6.3, it is proposed to de-
fine the European Union wide regulatQ.ry framework for levies to all (registered) pesticides 
used in the agricultural sector of the European Union. 
6.3  The charge base of the EU wide levy 
Alike the defi,nition of the products involved in the framework, there are several possibili-
ties to base on  a European Union wide levy on  pesticides.  In  Denmark, for example, the 
retail price of the pesticides is used as the base of the levy, whereas in  Sweden the levy 
is put on the active ingredient of the pesticides. 
Below,  in  Table 6.4;  four options to  base on  a European  Union wide levy on  pesticides 
have been evaluated against the criteria set out in section 6.1. These options are:  putting 
the levy on  the environmental hazards caused by  the pesticides,  putting the levy on  th.e 
dosage of the means,  putting the levy on  the value of the pesticides (by  using the retail 
price or wholesale price), and putting the levy on the active ingredients of the .Pesticides. 
Again in this Table a ./ is used to denote that the option scores satisfactory towards the 
criteria  ..  When .  possible  a  distinction  is  made  between  the  options  from  ./(most)  to 
./(least). In  the Table a  X  is  used  to  denote the fact that an  option cannot satisfy the 
criterion. 
Table 6.4  Four options with respect to the. charge base of an EU wide  levy 
Options  Env. effect.  Easy to ace.  Acceptabl~  Ec. efficient 
•  environmental hazards  ./(most)  ./(least)  ./(most) 
•  dosage of the means  ./  X 
•  value of the pesticides  ./  ¥"'(more) 
•  active ingredients  ./ 
Source: ElM 
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.  \ Ideally, the EU wide levy should be based on the negative effects the pesticides pose to 
the envirqnment.  Whereas the contemporary literature on  this  issue (see,  for example, 
Vos,  1998;  Danish  EPA,  1995;  RSPB,  1998) claims that there are too  many  problems 
surrounding this option for it to be useful - for example, because of the difficulties in sum-
mating the various types of environmental damage into one single target -,  the analysis in 
chapter 5 has shown that a classification directed to the aquatic environment is workable, 
albeit not indisputable.  Therefore,  the option  of using  the  hazards of the  pesticides  as 
charge base of the EU wide levy is still regarded imaginable. 
Of course, it is acknowledged that the easiness to accomplish such a classification will be 
the  lowest of the stated options in  Table 6.4.  As mentioned  in  chapter 5,  it seems that 
much  more research  pn  this topic is  needed  before a  hazard-based differentiated  levy 
system can be implemented in_ the European Union. On the other hand, the acceptability 
of basing the levy on the hazards the fpesticides pose to the environment will probably be 
the highest of the four options.  This  is  because there is a close natural connection  be-
tween the base of the levy and the major aim of the European Union wide levy: improving 
the environment in the European 'Union. 
Wher,eas putting the levy on the approved dosages of the means could also be environ-
mentally effective, the discussion in  Article 416 of the Danish tax on pesticides (see Dan-
ish EPA,  1995, pp.  7-9) clearly indicates that implementing an  effective and transparent 
. levy on  the basis of the approved dosages of the means is very difficult to  realise:  the 
main  reason  being  the  many  variations  in  approved  dosages  for the  same  pesticides. 
Variations that depend on the crop and  pest for which the  pesticid~s are actually used. 
Hence, this option has not been further evaluated in Table 6.4. 
It is ambiguous whether a levy which is based on the value of the pesticides wiU  be more 
effective to the environment than a levy which  is  based on  the active ingredients of the 
pesticides. This is because a levy which is put on the value of the pesticides favours the 
_ inexpensive pesticides which are usually also the older and  more hazardous ones (see 
Danish EPA, 1995). By the same token, a levy which is based on the active ingredients of 
the pesticides does not necessarily relate to the environmental burden of the products. 
This is because the intensity of the means bought by the farmers can differ largely.
15 The 
argument in favour of putting the levy on the value of the pesticides - which is also used in 
Denmark- is that the cheaper, older and more hazardous products can be handled effec-
tively by other policy instruments, such as speeding up Council Directive 91/414/EEC.
16 
15  Vas (1998) has illustrated the above dilemma on the basis of two herbicides: Roundup and  Harmony. The 
first product costs about € 8 per litter whereas the second product costs about € 2.000 per kg.  Due to the · 
fact that the amount of active ingredrents in the first product is much higher than the amount in the second 
product, a levy based on  active ingredients would  have a large impact on  the price of the first product gut 
only a slight impact on the price of the second one. 
16  It should be  noted that policy-makers in  Sweden are thinking of changing their current levy on  pesticides, 
which is based on active ingredients into a  levy which is based of the value of pesticides. 
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seem to be no major differences. In fact,  for both options there is some practical experi-
ence in Denmark and Sweden. 
Regarding the economic efficiency of the  options,  an  EU  wide  levy which  is  put on  the 
value of the pesticides is considered somewhat more efficient than a levy which is put on 
the  active ingredients.  The main  reason  behind  this  position  is  the fact that putting  the 
levy. on the value of the pesticides will give a higher clarity to the farmers involved. Basi-
cally  it is  assumed that the  more the farmers  understand-why (some of the)  pesticides 
have  become  more  expensive  (for  example,  by  using  environmental  levy-labels),  the 
more they are prone to adjust their behaviour. 
Consequently, on the basis of the evaluation presented in Table 6..4,  if is proposed to put 
the  European  Union wide levy on  th~ value of the  pesticides:  It is,  however,  difficult to 
determine whether the value-based levy should be revealed in the retail price of the pesti-
cides or in the wholesale price.  It seems reasonable that each Member State will be free 
to choose between these possibilities. This is because the infrastructure of distribution of 
the pesticides differs largely across the  Member States (see  Brouwer et al.,  1994).  For 
example,  in  countries where farmers buy their means mostly from the retailers,  the levy 
should be put on the retail price (and vice versa)
17
• 
6.4  The charge rate of the EU wide levy 
In Article 6 and  7 of the regulatory framework on  the taxation of energy,  exact minimum 
levels of taxation are presented and differentiated to the various energy products (petrol, 
gas,  etceteras).  At this  moment,  it is  not possible to  be  that precise for the  taxation  of 
pesticides. 
In chapter 5 a levy of 20% was used per kg of active ingredient for all pesticides involved 
This levy was doubled for the  most hazardous ones and  halved for the least hazardous 
ones.  Whereas this procedure and  percentages have  been  used  for illustrative reasons 
only, it should be noted that a levy of 20% falls within the current available evidence in the 
Member States of the European Union.  In Sweden,  for example, the pesticide tax entails 
a price increase of € 2 per kg of active ingredient, which results in a mean price increase 
of 5%.  In  Denmark,  the charge rate entails a price increase of 37% for insecticides and 
15o/o for herbicides and fungicides. 
Another argument that favours the  plausibility of an  EU  wide  levy of about 20%  stems 
from the  information gathered  by  Brouwer et al.  (  1994) on  the  costs of pesticides as  a 
percentage of the total yield.  Table 6.5 below presents a condensed overview of th~ dif-
17  In  Table 6.1  the possibifity was mentioned of varying the .charge  base  among the different types of pesti-
cides: for example,· a value-based levy system for fungicides,  a levy based on active ingredients for herbi-
cides.  etceteras.  At the  moment,  there  seems  to  be  no  major reason  to  construct such  a differentiated 
charge base-system. 
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vided by 13 different crops. Next to the average cost shares of pesticides this Table also 
presents the lowest and highest cost shares (between brackets are presented the Mem-
ber States involved) . 
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costs of  pesticides as percentage of  the output 
lowest  highest 
1% (Sp., lrl)  13% (Bel.) 
1% (Sp., lrl.)  14% (Bel.) 
0% (lrl., lt.)  6% (Neth., Bel.} 
i  . 
0% (Gre.}  10% (Bel.} 
1% (lt., Sp.)  11% (Ger.} 
0% (Bel., Fr., UK}  3% (lt.) 
0% (Gre., lrl.}  2% (Bel., Dk., Ger., 
Sp., Por., UK, Neth.} 
0% (Gre., Neth., Ger.,  2% (UK} 
Sp., Fr., lt.) 
1% (Gre., SP ., Fr.}  25% (UK} 
0% (Lux.)  5% (Por., Fr.) 
0% (Sp., lrl.)  8% (Ok.) 
0% (lrl.)  21% (lt.) 
1% (lt.)  7% (Por.) 
Table 6.5 shows that the costs of pesticides form only a minor part of the output of the 
crops. Only in the cultivation of grapes for table wine in the UK pesticide costs comprise a 
substantial part of the output (25%). The average cost share for all arable crops is 6% and 
for horticultural crops 3%.  Hence,  an  EU  wide levy of  20%,  or even 30%, will  have no 
major impacts on the total costs at the farm (see chapter 5)~ On the other hand, _such  a 
levy could have a great influence on the farmers' behaviourwith respect to pesticide use  .. 
In the regulatory framework on the taxation of energy products minimum levies have been 
introduced,  divided by  the various energy products.  Such a  charge rate  system is  only 
"  . 
. one of the possible options. In Table 6.6 four rate systems have been evaluated against 
the criteria set out in  section 6.1.  These systems are:  fixed  rates for all types of pesti-
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specific types of pesticides and minimum rates which are differentiated to specific types of 
pesticides. 
Table 6.6  Four options with respect to the charge rate system of an EU wide  levy 
Options  Env.effect.  Ec. efficient  Easy to ace.  Acceptable 
•  fixed rates (general)  v"  v"  v" (more)  v" 
•  minimum rates (general)  v"  v"  -1' (more)  v" (more) 
•  fixed rates (differentiated)  v" (more)  v" (more)  v"  v" 
•  minimum rates (differentiated)  v" (more)  v" (more)  v"  v" (more) 
Source: ElM 
From Table 6.6  it can  be  seen  that the  effectiveness  and  efficiency  of a differentiated 
charge rate is considered superior than those of a general rate.  The reason  behind this 
position relates to the outcomes presented in chapter 5:  i.e., not all pesticides used in the 
agricultural sector are equally harmful to the environment. An  adequate European  Union 
wide  regulatory  framework for levies  on  pesticides  should  be  able  to  charge  the  more 
·hazardous pesticides more to  stimulate the  farmers'  behaviour. towards less hazardous 
pesticides of other plant protection devices. 
Off course, imposing the same levy on all types of pesticides is easier to accomplish than 
imposing different levies to different types of pesticides. With respect to the acceptability 
of the four charge rate systems, a minimum rate system is considered more acceptable 
as  individual  Member States  have  more  autonomy  to  adjust  the  system  to  their  own 
needs. 
Ideally, the charge rate should be differentiated towards the environmental hazards posed 
by the pesticides. In fact, the charge rate system introduced in chapter 5 could be used as 
a basis:  i.e., double the rate for the most hazardous pesticides and halve it for the least 
hazardous pesticides. As an alternative, it is proposeq to differentiate the charge rate to-
wards the different types of pesticides: insecticides, fungicides, herbicides and other pes-
ticides, alike the system in Denmark. 
Consequently, on the basis of the eyaluation presented in Table 6.6,  it is proposed to se-
lect a charge rate system with minimum rates,  preferably  ~ifferentiated towards the envi-
ronmental hazards of the  pesticides.  When  this  is  not feasible,  a differentiation towards 
the various types of pesticides could be a useful alternative. 
6.5  Collecting the revenues of the EU wide levy · 
The collection of the revenues of the European Union wide levy should be chosen in such 
a way that both  the  administrative costs of the  levy  and  possibilities of fraud  are  mini-
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I. mised.  In  this respect,  Oskam et al.  (1997) have compared the existing  levy systems in 
the European  Union on  the  basis of their administrative costs.  In  Denmark,  the  annual 
administrative costs have been estimated at 0.5% of the  levy revenue, whereas in  Swe-
den these costs were estimated ten  times  less.  The relatively  large difference between 
the  two  countries  is  mainly  due  to  tlie complicated  charge  base  system  in  Denmark, 
where each pesticide can  or package has to be  labelled with  a fixed  price including the 
levy and VAT. 
In  both countries, the companies that produce the pesticides act as intermediary for col-
lecting  and  passing  on  the  revenues of the  levy.  At this  level  the  number of collection 
points is very limited, thereby simplifying the implementation and enforcement of the levy. 
All other imposition points- i.e., the farmers involved, the retailers, the wholesalers- are 
inferior to the industry, making the imRiementation of the levy more complicated and more 
difficult to enf0rce.  :· 
6.6  Reimbursing the revenues of the EU wide levy 
There are various ways to allocate and  use the  revenues of an  EU  wide  levy on  pesti-
cides.  In a recent report to the Dutch Ministry of Hc;>using,  Spatial  Pl~mning and  Environ-
ment, Vos (1998) distinguished three organisations to which the revenues could be allo-
cated: 
•  to society (European Union or the Member States), 
•  to the agricultural sec~or; 
•  to the farmers involved (those who actually pay the levy). 
For each  organisation,  Vos  (1998)  presented  some  possibilities  to  actually  refund  the 
revenues.  For example, if the revenues are allocated to  society, they can  be used to re-
duce the budget deficit pr to reduce the existing charges on  labour. Yet,  if the revenues 
are allocated to the agricultural sector, they can  be  used for pesticides related  research 
and development activities, for speeding up the review of Council Directive 91/414/EEC, 
for programs that stimulate integrated pest management, for subsidies to innovate envi-
ronmental-friendly  pesticides,  etceteras.  With  respect to allocating  the  revenues  to  the 
farmers involved, Vos (1998) distinguished two separate ways: the revenues can  be  re-
funded in a neutral way or they can be refunded in a rewarding way. The latter option in-
cludes, for example, subsidies on  investments in  sustainable plant protection devices.  In 
Fig-ure 6.1  the above-mentioned has been visualised. 
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As using the revenues of the levy on pesticides for general purposes is not acceptable for 
those involved, this option has not been evaluated in Table 6. 7.  In this Table three differ-
ent options are evaluated against the criteria set out in  section 6.1:  an  allocation of the 
revenues to the agricultural sector using it for general purposes, an allocation .to the farm-
ers involved using it on a neutral base and an allocation of the revenues to the farmers 
involved thereby using it on a rewarding base. 
Table 6.7  Three options with respect to allocating the revenues of an EU-wide levy 
Options  Env.-effect.  Ec. efficient  Easy to ace.  Acceptable 
•  agricultural sector  ./  ~  ~(most)  ~(least) 
(general purpose) 
•  farmers involved (neu- ~(least)  ~(least)  ~  ~ 
tral base) . 
•  farmers involved (re- ~  ~  ~(less)  ~ 
warding base) 
Source: ElM 
Of the three options presented in Table 6.7, the environmentally effectiveness of an allo-
cation of the revenues to the farmers involved, using ·the revenues on a neutral base,  is 
regarded the least effective. This is because this way of compensating does not contain a 
'second' incentive - the first one being the levy - to the farmers to change their behaviour 
into a more environmental-friendly way. It is as yet -unclear whether using the revenues of 
the levy for general purposes (option 1  ),  such as research and development activities or 
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some form of sustainable pesticide management (option  3).  Much depends on  the con-
crete use of the revenues and the amount of revenues.  . 
.  The arguments used above can also be applied to the economic efficiency of the options. 
As option 1 and 3 stimulate farmers to further reduce or adjust their current pesticide use 
these options are regarded more efficient than option 2. 
Allocating the revenues to the agricultural sector and using it for general purposes is more 
easy to accomplish than refunding the revenues to the farmers involved. In fact, using the 
revenues to reward  farmers to change their behaviour in  a more environmental-friendly 
way is probably the most difficult option to accomplish. For the Netherlands, Vas (1998) 
has studied the possibilities of using a levy on pesticides to reward four typical Dutch fis-
cal regulations. His results are promisjng. Nevertheless, the Dutch case cannot be simply 
duplicated to other Member States as' there are important differences with respect to the 
(fiscal) regulations and  legislature.  If this option  is  regarded  the most promising,  it de-
mands further research on possible regulations in the 15 Member States. 
~inally, the acceptability of the first option  is regarded the worst since some sectors  in 
agriculture could be unjustifiably favoured in this option. 
Consequently, on the basis of the evaluation presented in Table 6.7,  it is proposed to re-
imburse the revenues of the EU  wide levy to the farmers involved. and to use  the reve-
nues for (fiscal)  regulations  in  the agricultural  sector which  further stimulate farmers  to 
change their behaviour in  a more environmental-friendly way.  Note that this kind of alter-
native is also ranked number 1 in  the Communication from the Commission on  Environ-
mental taxes and charges in the single market (CEC,  1997 p.  13). It is acknowledged that 
this option is not easy to accomplish. Therefore, it is proposed to start the EU wide regu-
latory framework for levies ·an  pesticides with a·n  allocation of the revenues to the sector 
and to use a part of these revenues for additional research on adequate regulations in the 
agricultural sector of the different Member States to refund the revenues to. 
6. 7  The contours of an  EU_ wide regulatory framework for levies on 
pesticides 
How does the contours of the EU wide regulatory framework for levies on pesticides looks 
like? In the preceding sections the following proposals have been put forward. 
•  First,  it is proposed to define the framework to all (registered) pesticides used in  the 
agricultural sector of the European Union.  Potentially,  this  definition will  produce the 
most beneficial effects to the environment. 
•  Second, it is proposed to put the EU wide levy on the value of the pesticides, alike the 
current system in  Denmark.  In  the framework each  Member State should  be free  to 
choose the retail price or the wholesale price as the exact charge basis of the levy. For 
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erably be revealed in the retail price. 
•  Third,  the charge rate system of the EU  wide regulatory framework consists of mini-
mum rates that are, preferably, differentiated towards the environmental hazards of the 
pesticides. If such a differentiation is not feasible, it is proposed to differentiate the levy 
towards the various types of pesticides. With respect to the charge rate, a levy of 20% 
is regarded plausible given the high efficiency of using the pesticides in the agricultural 
sector of the  European  Union,  and  given  the  outcomes  of the  pesticide  chains  in 
chapter 5. 
•  Fourth,  industry should be  used to collect and  pass on  the revenues of the  EU  wide 
levy. At this level the number of collection points is very limited, thereby simplifying the 
implementation and enforcement of the levy. All other imposition points- i.e., the farm-
ers involved, the retailers, the wholesalers- are inferior to the industry. 
•  Finally,  it is proposed to  reimburse the revenues of the  EU  wide levy to the farmers 
involved and to use the revenues for (fiscal) regulations in the agricultural sector which 
further stimulate farmers to  change their behaviour in  a more environmental-friendly 
way. It is acknowledged that this option is not easy to accomplish. 
Table 6.8 provides an overview of the proposed decisions on  the five consequential ele-
ments of a European Union wide regulatory framework for environmental levies on  pesti-
cides, together with the scores on the criteria set out in section 6.1. 
Table 6.8  An overview of the decisions on the consequential elements of an EU wide framework on pesticides 
Env. effect.  Ec. efficient  Easy to ace.  Acceptable 
products involved  ./(most)  ./  ./.  ./ 
•  all pesticides used in th 
agr~cultural sector 
charge base  ./  ./(more)  ./  ./ 
•  value of the pesticides 
charge rate system  ./(more)  ./(more)  ./  ./(more) 
•  minimum rates (differ-
entiated) 
imposition points  ./(most)  ./(most)  ./ 
•  industry 
allocation of  revenues  ./  ./  ./(less)  ./ 
•  farmers involved (re-
warding base) 
Source: ElM 
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7.1  Introduction 
This finat chapter of the  report is  divided  into four sections.  In  section  7.2  three  essential . 
elements of the study are described: i.e., the background of the ~tudy, the key objective of 
the study and the approach which was used to answer the research questions. In section 
7.3 the most important conclusions that originate from the various chapters are reported. 
Together these sections form a brief summary of the  issues discussed  in  this study.  In 
section  7.4  general conclusions on  the  topic of an  EU  wide  levy  on  pesticides  will  be 
drawn. 
7.2  Background, objective  ~nd  approach of the study 
Background of  the study 
Whereas it is  generally acknowledged that the  use of pesticides 
18  has large benefits to 
farmers, the present use of pesticides in  agriculture also causes negative environmental 
(and health-related) effects to society. For example, during and after· application of pesti-
cides a substantial amount of it could  end  up in  soil,  ground- and  surface water or air. 
These negative effects demands for an effective policy. Such policies have been initiated, 
both at the level of the individual Member States of the European  Unio~ and at the level of 
the European Union itself. 
At the level of the European Union, at present, Council Directi.ve 91/414/EEC concerning 
the placing of plant protection produCts on the internal market is probably the most promi-
nent regulation. Whereas administrating this Council Directive will decrease the number 
of active ingredients on  the internal market, full implementation is expected to take quite 
some time.  Given this  implementation problem,  and  the fact that administrating  Council 
Directive 91/414/EEC will mainly ensure specified safety standards for pesticides without 
affecting  the quantities  used,  there  seems  a need  to  broaden  current European  Union 
policy activities on pesticides. 
In this regard,  DG-XI has initiated a long-term project in co-operation with the Dutch Min-
istry of Housing, Spatial Planning and  Environment,  aimed at developing and evaluating 
new 'instruments and  strategies for an  additional  EU  pesticides policy,  defined as addi-
tional to the present EU  legislation, in particular Council Directive 91/414/EEC. This long-
term  project consists of two  phases.  The first phase was concluded  in  1994,  while  the 
second phase was concluded in 1998. A total of eight studies have been published during 
18  This study deals with the plant protection  products which  are  covered  by Council  Directive  91/414/EEC. 
These products are mainly used  in  agriculture and usually referred to as pesticides.  Yet,  in  EU  legislation 
pesticides are divided into plant protection products and biocides. Hence, when the word 'pesticides' is used 
in this report, it should be recognized that the plant protection products are meant as covered by Council Di-
rective 91/414/EEC. 
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effective .in  reducing the use of harmful pesticides in the European Union (see Oskam et 
al.  1997). ·However, a comprehensive evaluation of the economic and environmental ef-
fects of such a levy was not one of the key objectives of the long-term project. 
In acknowledging the potential effectiveness of a levy to reduce the use of harmful pesti-
cides in the European Union, DG XI  initiated in  1997 a separate project to investigate the 
pro's and  contra's of such a levy,  and  to  define the contours of an  EU  wide regulatory 
framework for the taxation of pesticides.  Note that an  EU wide levy on  pesticides would 
be in  line with the 8h  Environmental Action Program (FEAP) which proposes to broaden 
the range of policy instruments from direct regulation towards economic instruments. 
Objective of  the study and research QLI.estions 
.  I 
As there is little experience in the Member States of the European Union with respect to a 
levy on pesticides it seems justified to represent the evaluation of such a levy as a kind of 
'grey box': both VJith respect to its economic and environmental effects and with respect to 
defining a best working EU wide regulatory framework. As a consequence, the key objec-
tive of this study was to enlighten this grey box. 
It sho_uld  be recognised that sue~ a process  ~f enlightenment is warranted, given the im-
plementation problem of Council Directive 91/414/EEC, the necessary environmental im-
provements in the European Union to reach the ambitious goals set out in FEAP, and the 
need to harmonise the internal market on  this subject:  i.e.  in  case a levy on  pesticides 
would be defined by tne Commission, the basic elements of this levy should  hold for all 
Member States to avoid discrimination. 
The following  research  questions were derived  from  the above-stated  objective of this 
study.  · 
I:  In what respect is the experience presently available in the Member States on the use 
of pesticides useful for developing an EU wide regulatory-framework for levies on pes-
ticides? 
·  2.  What would constitute the ideal EU wide levy on pesticides? 
3.  Are there potential bottlenecks,  if any,  which  could  hinder the introduction of such a 
levy on pesticides? 
4.  What are the main economic and environmental effects of an  EU  wide levy on pesti-
cides? 
5.  What would  constitute  the  ideal  EU  wide  regulatory  framework  for  levies  on  pesti-
cides? 
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,  The approach which  has been  followed  to  answer the  above-stated  research questions 
consists of fol:Jr major elements. 
•  Desk-research and expert interviews on the use of pesticides in the Member States of 
the Eu.ropean· Union, on the effectiveness of a levy on pesticides, on ways to define a 
EU wide regulatory framework, etceteras. 
•  Building an economic model to analyse the main economic effects of an  EU wide levy 
on pesticides. These effects  rela~e to the change in using the pesticides, the change in 
pesticide costs at thefarm,  the change in  gross margin  per farmer,  and  the expected 
revenues of the imposed levy. 
•  Developing a classification scheme of pesticides on the basis of their negative effects 
i 
to the aquatic environment.  In  fac~~ seven classes have been distinguished. The most 
' hazardous pesticides ar.e  those pesticides which are very toxic to  aquatic organisms 
and  may  cause  long-term  adverse  effects  in  the  aquatic  environment  (class  IJ, 
whereas the  'least'  hazardous  pesticides  are  those  pesticides which  are  harmful  to 
aquatic organisms (class VII). 
•  Using so-called pesticide chains to come up with thorough estimates of the economic 
and environmental effeCts of a levy on  pesticides. A pesticide chain consists of a cer-
tain type of pesticide, a certain crop in which the pesticide is used and a certain region 
in the European Union. An example of a pesticide chain is  fungicides in cucumbers in 
England and Wales.  By  using  this  concept it was  expected  that,  on  the  one  hand, 
. enough detailed information on  the types of pesticide used,  their environmental haz-
ards,  prices,  and  alternatives  can  be  collected  in  order to  gain  reliable  outcomes, 
while, on the other hand,  it was expected that_ the outcomes are broad enough to de-
sign on an EU wide regulatory framework for levies on pesticides. 
7.3  Conclusions from the various chapters 
Below,  the  most important conclusions that originate  from  the  various. chapters  of this 
study are reported. The relevant chapters are mentioned between brackets. 
1.  At present,  there is  little experience available in  the Member. States of the European 
---union which is useful for evaluating the econ9mic and environmental effects of an  EU 
wide levy on  pesticides and  for designing a best working  EU  wide regulatory frame-
work. (Chapter 3) 
2.  Although a levy on  pesticides is·judged effective and useful, compared to other policy 
instruments, such as arrangements and regulations to reduce the use of harniful pesti-
cides in the European Union,  many scientists and policy makers involved believes that 
speeding  up  the review of Council  Directive·91/414/EEC is .the  most effective policy 
instrument ~t the moment. (Chapter 3) 
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,. 3.  !he ideal  EU  wide levy on  pesticides consists of five essential features:  it discrimi-
nates effectively among the various pesticides, it is set at the correct rate, it has an ef-
ficient collection and effective reimbursement system, it is· fraud-proof and it provides a 
permanent incentive to the farmers. (Chapter 3) 
4.  The first tWo conditions of the ideal EU wide levy are confronted with major obstacles: 
on the one hand, because there is inadequate information on the (long-term) negative 
environmental effects of the pesticides, on the other hand, because it is difficult to set 
the EU  wide levy at the correct rate.  The other three -conditions of the ideal EU  wide 
levy, however, pose no major obstacles:(Chapter 3) 
5.  The review of' fifteen  European studies shows that the  d~mand of pesticides at the 
farms is so-called relatively inelastic: i.e., an overall price elasticitY of demand for pes-
ticides was computed  ranging  fro~ - 0.2 to - 0.5; The price elasticity of demand for 
herbicides,  fungicides  and  insecticides are,  however,  more elastic.  For herbicides it 
I 
lies between - 0.7 to - 0.9, for fungicides between - 0.4 to - 0.8,  and for insecticides-
between- 0.3 to- 0.8. (Chapter 4) 
6.  On the basis of the nine pesticide chains evaluated it was concluded that an EU wide 
·levy on pesticides of 20% will have a substantial impact on the use of pesticides at the 
farms.
19 An average decrease was computed of 14% for scenario 1 (one levy of 20% 
for all  pesticides) and  18% of scenario 2 (a low levy of 10% for the least hazardous 
pesticides, a high levy of 40% for the most hazardous pesticides and a levy of 20% for 
all other pesticides). (Chapter 5). 
7.  The evaluations of the pesticide chains showed that the economic effects of a levy on 
pesticides of 20% are limited. An average increase of the total costs at the farms was 
computed of 0.1% for scenario 1 and 0.02% of scenario 2. Also the reductions in gross 
margin per farmer are also relatively small:  € -143 versus € -155. (It should be noted 
that these income reductions were calculated  without a  reimbursement-of the  reve-
nues.  By  using  an  effective re-allocation  of the revenues the reported  decreases in 
gross margin should be reduced.) (Chapter 5) 
8.  An explanation of the large differences between the environmental and economic ef-· 
fects of a levy on  pesticides of 20% relates to the relatively bigh  efficiency in  using -
pesticides in agriculture. Due to this high  effici~ncy- i.e., the estimated cost-shares in 
the pesticides used  in  the nine  pesticide chains  lie  between 2% and  6% - the eco-
nomic effects of a EU wide levy will be largely neutralised. (Chapter 5) 
19  It should be  recognized that the outcomes of the nine pesticides chains depend heavily on the assump-
tions stated  in  section  5.2.  Most probably,  other levy scenario's, other price elasticity's of demand and 
other assumptions on  the  extent of substitution or complementary between the  pesticides will result  in 
other values.  · 
ElM I Haskoning 9.  On the basis of the outcomes of the nine pesticide chains it cannot be concluded that 
the results can be simply generalised to some higher level qf aggregation. (Chapter 5) 
10.As the contemporary information on the effects of a levy on pesticides is inadequate, it 
was not possible to present a blueprint for a best working  EU  wide regulatory frame-
work for levies on pesticides. Instead a charcoal sketch of such a framework, including 
propositions for five major consequential elements, has been put forward. (Chapter 6) 
11.With respect to the ch~rge base system of the EU wide regulatory framework it is pro-
posed to base the levy on the value of the pesticides (alike the system now in  opera-
tion in Denmark). (Chapter 6) 
12. With respect to the charge rate system of the EU  wide regulatory framework it is pro-
posed to  set minimum  rates  that are,  preferably,  differentiated  towards  the  environ-
mental hazards of the pesticides.  (~f such a differentiation is not feasible, it is proposed 
... to differentiate the levy towards the various types of pestiCides.) (Chapter 6) 
13. With respect to the reimbursement system of the EU  wide regulatory framework it is 
proposed to reimburse the revenues of the levy to the farmers involved and preferable 
use them for (fiscal) regulations in the agricultural sector which further stimulate farm-
ers to change their behaviour in a more environmental-friendly way. 
7.4  General conclusions 
It is recalled here that the key objective of this study was  to enlighten the grey box of an 
EU wide levy on pesticides. The first general conclusion of this study is that this objective 
has been achieved only  partially.  For example,  during  the course of the research  it be-
came clear that for important topics,  such as establishing an  undisputed classification of 
the pesticides on their negative effects to the environment and setting the levy at the cor-
rect rate,  there is still work to be done. This also holds for the assumptions which had to 
be made on the extent of substitution and complementary between the various pesticides 
in a pesticide chain. 
A second general conclusion of this study is that introducir:'g  an  EU ·wide levy on  pesti-
cides will be both effective and useful.  It will be effective  insofar as all (registered) pesti-
cides used in the agricultural sectors of the EU Member States fall under the levy. Moreo-
ver,  it will be effective insofar as the levy is based on the value of the pesticides. 
20 It will 
be effective insofar as the EU  wide levy aims to differentiate between the pesticides in-
volved,  preferably on  the basis of their negative effects to  the environment.  Finally,  the 
levy will be effective because it creates an automatic incentive for the farmers to use their 
pesticides more efficiently.  It will be useful because an  EU wide levy on  pesticides forms 
an  excellent addition  to  Council  Directive  91/414/EEC.  Moreover,  it will  be  useful,  be-
20  In this regard, it is assumed that administrating Council Directive 91/414/EEC guarantees the removal of the 
older, cheaper and more hazardous pesticides from the market. 





I~ cause an  EU  wide levy on  pes.ticides will further stimulate industry to  innovate towards-
more environmental-friend_ly pesticides. Finally, it. will be useful, because Member States' 
arguments on possible 'leakage's' at the borders and harming domestic farmers and  in-
dustry will become trivial if the levy is set at the level of the European Union. 
The third  general conclusion  relates to the EU  wide regulatory  framework for levies on 
pesticides. Despite the above positive characteristics of an  EU  wide levy on  pesticides it 
should be  noted that some important elements of the regulatory framework for levies on 
pesticides cannot be resolved within the scope of this study. 
For example, it is unclear at the moment what the exact rate of, the EU wide levy on pesti-
cides should be and how it could be differentiated adequately. Whereas the proposal for 
·differentiated minimum rates at the EU  level still holds, it is argued that the exact minJma 
(alike the regulatory framework on  en~rgy products) cannot be determined on the basis of 
current experiences in the European Union. In chapter 5 a levy of 20% was used for illus-
trative reasons.  In section 6.4 such a rate has been justified on  the basis of the relative 
low pesticides costs as percentage of the total yield. Yet,  it is acknowledged that this ar-
gumentation is too brittle to actually base on specific minimum rates of the various levies. 
Related to this topic is the extent of differentiation of the EU  wide levy on  pesticides.  In 
chapter 4 a classification was introduced based on the negative effects of the pesticides 
to the aquatic environment. Albeit debatable, this classification was used in  chapter 5. to 
base a levy system on.  In  essence,  it was found  that a differentiated  levy  system  per-
formed better than a undifferentiated levy system. Consequently, the ideal EU wide regu-
latory framework for levies on  pesticides should  base their classification system on  the 
environmental  hazards  of the  pesticides.  Yet,  much  more research  on  this topic is  re-
quired_ before an undisputed classification system can be· established. 
Also the precise level of detail of the  EU  wide regulatory framework on  pesticides war-
rants further investigation.  For example,  in  chapter 2 it was concluded that an  EU  wide 
regulatory framework for levies on pesticides should take into account the countries' spe-
cifi_c agronomic ci~cumstances in order to be acceptable. Questions which should be an-
swered in this regard are: To what extent should the Commission define the exact charge 
base of the levy'?, To what extent should the Commission define the various differenti-
ated levies on pesticides;?, or To what extent should the. Commission define the way the 
revenues  s~ould be reimbursed to the agricultural sector'? Although these questions fall 
outside the scope of this study, the issue did come up in defining the charge rate system 
(section 6.4), the charge base system (section 6.3) and the reimbursement system (sec-
tion 6. 6). More research on this topic is needed in order to provide conclusive answers. 
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I An.nex 1:  Searching the relevant information 
The methodology used to search the relevant information on the selected pesticide chains 
within the Member States of the European Union, can be divided into two approaches: 
1. Search for databases and literature. 
2.  Personal contacts with experts on pesticides. 
Ad 1 Search for databases and literature 
By both the HASKONING Information Centre and the  HASKO~ING  Documentation Cen-
tre  qn  Environmental  Legislation  extensive  searches  were  performed  to  gather  sub-
stance-specific  information  on  the  vo!umes  and  characteristics  of pesticides,  type  and 
size of business, alternative methods f.etceteras.  The most important information sources 
consulted were: 
•  FADN (Farm Accounting Data Ne~ork), via LEI-DLO; 
•  Eurostat; 
•  Central Statistics Bureau of the Netherlands (CBS); 
•  SwetScan; 
•  FAO Statistical Data 1990-1998; 
•  Pesticides Trust; 
•  Pesticide Action Network (PAN); 
•  International Substances Information System (ISIS/RISKLINE); 
•  Agrow's West European Fact Files; 
•  Library  of the  Dutch  Ministry  of  Housing,  Spatial  Planning  ano  the  Environment 
(VROM); 
•  Library of the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Fisheries .(LNV); 
•  Library of the National Institute of Public Health and the Environment (RIVM); 
•  Library of the Wageningen Agricultural University (Mansholt lnstitu_te), via Agralin; 
•  PES-A studies: 
•  Handboek  Bestrijdingsmiddelen,  1995  (Van  Rijn,  Van  Straalen  and  Willems)  (in 
Dutch); 
•  Gewasbeschermingsgids, 1995 (IKC & PO) (in Dutch). 
•  The Pesticide Manual, 1991 (Wothing & Hance, eds); 
•  European Council Directives .91/414/EEC, 93/21/EEC. 
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for individual  pesticides  in  the  Member States  of the  European  Union.  For the  Dutch 
situation, however, useful data on  pesticide use in  specific crops have been found.  The 
international  da~a on  pesticides that were found  did  not refer to individual  pesticides or 
specific crops but to categories of pesticides (fungicides, insecticides) and general appli.: 
cations  (cultivation  under glass,  arable agriculture).  Such  data  are  not suitable  for the 
pesticide chains. Therefore the second approach- contacting experts on  pesticid~s within 
the sele_9ted Member States- was used to complete the information needed. 
Ad 2 Personal-contacts with experts on pesticides 
Several contacts  ~ere made with  experts to collect the  specific information  on  the  se-
lected pesticide chains. Those contac~s were made by telephone, telefax and e-mail: 
I 
•  Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF, United Kingdom); 
•  Pesticides Safety Directorate (executive agency of MAFF, United Kingdom); 
•  Pesticides Usage Survey Group (executive agency of MAFF, United Kingdom); 
•  Posford Duvivier Ltd, Peterborough (United Kingdom); 
•  Alatec/HASKONING S.A., Madrid (Spain); 
•  Ministerio de Obras Publrcitas, Transportes Y Media Ambiente (Spain); 
•  Generalitat Valencia, Conselleria D'agricultura, Pesca Y Alimentaci6n (Spain); 
•  Ministerio de Agricultura Pesca Y Alimei1taci6n -Madrid (Spain); 
•  Ministerio de Agricultura Pesca Y Alimentaci6n - S~villa (Spain); 
•  Ministerio de Agricultura Pesca Y Alimentaci6n- Almeria (Spain); 
•  Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (Sweden); 
•  Miljodepartementet (Sweden); 
•  Swedish Board of Agriculture (Sweden); 
•  Ministere de I'Environnement, Direction de I'Eau (France); 
•  Ministere de !'Agriculture (France); 
•  Several wholesalers of pesticides (the Netherlands); 
•  DHV Consultants (the Netherlands); 
•  Wageningen Agricultural University (the Netherlands); 
•  Agricultural Economics Research -Institute (LEI-DLO) (the Netherlands); 
•  Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Fisheries (LNV) (the Netherlands). 
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Due to the precarious character of the study -analysing the possibilities of an  EU  wide 
levy on pesticides - it was decided not to contact the international and national trade or-
ganisations of pesticides manufacturing and formulating industry. Instead, all relevant' re-
sponsible authorities in the selected Member States were consulted. 
It appeared that the information needs for the selected pesticide chains were extremely 
hard to collect. 
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Pesticide chain I : Fungicides in lettuce in England and Wales 
Identification 
Crop: Lettuce 
Function pesticide: fungicide; protection against mildew 
Important chemical means; 
- Propamocarb-hydrochloride (by killing fungi) 
- Fosetyl-aluminium (stimulation of plants' natural resistance) 
- T  olclofos-methyl 
- Thiram (blockade of metabolism in fungi by inhibiting certain enzyr,nes in citric acid cycle) 
Country: England/Wales 
Volume applied per  year (ref.: Pesticide Usage Survey, MAFF) 
- Propamocarb-hydrochloride: 7.84 ton (active ingredient) 
- Fosetyl-aluminium: 3.77 ton (active ingredient) 
- Tolclofos-methyl: 3.04 ton (active ingredient) 
- Thiram: 1.60 tori (active ingredient) 
Costs (costs pesticide as a percentage of  the total yield) 
About 2% (estimated on the basis of the total of fungicides mentioned in LEI-DLO, 1994) 
Prices per  kilogram active ingredients 
- Propamocarb-hydrochloride: 75 Euro 
- Fosetyl-aluminium: 35 Euro 
- T olclofos-methyl: 70 Euro 
- Thiram: 10 Euro 
Type of  businesses 
Average size of farm: 4.1  ha (ref. Pesticide Usage Survey, MAFF) 
Classification (ref. ISIS/RISKLINE database; Van Rijn et al., 1995; Worthing, 1991) 
- Propamocarb-hydrochloride:  Harmful to  aquatic organisms  and  may cause  long-term  adverse 
effects in the aqua~ic  environment: category Ill 
- Fosetyl-aluminium: Harmful to aquatic organisms: category VII 
- T  olclofos-methyl: Toxic to aquatic organisms: category VI 
- Thiram: Very toxic to aquatic organisms and may cause long-term adverse effects in the aquatic 
environment: category I (only tested in pure water without micro-organisms) 
Alternatives (ref. Pesticide Usage Survey, MAFF) 
None 
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Pesticide chain 2 : Fungicides in green peppers in Almeria 
Identification 
Crop: Green peppers 
Function pesticide: fungicide; protection against mildew 





Country : Almeria (Spain) 
Volume applied per  year 
- Ethirimol: 7,700 1/year 
- Triflumizole: 14,000 1/year 
- Pyrifenox: .11 ,000 1/year 
- Triadimenol: 4,500 1/year 
Costs (costs pesticide as a percentage of  the total yield) 
About 322 million Pesetas for control of mildew in green peppers in Almeria; i.e. about 2 million 
Euro (1996; estimated by Consejeria d'Agricultura y Pesca,  Direction General de Ia  Produccion 
Agraria, Sevilla) 
Prices per  kilogram active ingredients 
- Ethirimol: 7 Euro 
- Triflumizole: 16 Euro 
- Pyrifenox: 16 Euro 
- Triadimenol: 18 Euro 
Type of  businesses 
Total area of green peppers in Almeria in  1996: 7,700 ha. (ref. Consejeria d'Agricultura y Pesca, · 
Direction General de Ia Produccion Agraria, Sevilla) 
Classification (ref. ISIS/RISKLINE d~tabase; Van Rijn et al., 1995; Worthing, 1991) 
- Ethirimol: Harmful to aquatic organisms: category VII 
- Tri.flumizole: Very toxic to aquatic organisms: category V 
- Pyrifenox: Toxic to aquatic organisms and  may cause long-term adverse effects in  the aquatic 
environment: category II 
~ Triadimenol:  Harmful  to  aquatic organisms  and  may ·cause  long-term adverse  effects  in  the 
aquatic environment: category Ill 
Alternatives (ref. Consejeria d'Agricultura y Pesca, Direction General de Ia  Produccion Agraria, 
Sevilla)· 
None 
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Identification 
Crop: Cucumbers 
Function pesticide; insecticide; protection of crop by killing the insects 
Important chemical means; 
- Nicotine (inhibition of neurotransmitter transport in neiVe system) 
- DichloiVos (inhibition of neurotransmitter transport in neiVe system) 
- Fenbutatin oxide (inhi_bition of neurotransmitter transport in neiVe system) 
- Propoxur (inhibition of neurotransmitter transport in neiVe system) 
Country : England/Wales 
Volum~  applied per  year (ref.: Pesticide Usage SuiVey, MAFF) 
- Nicotine: 0.12 ton (active ingredient) 
- DichloiVos: 0.09 ton (active ingredient) f. 
-.-fenbutatin: 0.07 ton (active ingredient) · 
- Propoxur: 0.06 ton (active ingredient) 
Costs (costs pesticide as a percentage of  the total yield) 
About 2% (estimated on the basis of the total of insecticides mentioned in LEI-DLO, 1994) 
Prices per  kilogram active ingredients 
- Nicotine: 45 Euro 
- DichloiVos: 45 Euro 
- Fenbutatin: 230 Euro 
- Propoxur: 180 Euro 
Type of  businesses 
Average size of farm: 3 ha (ref. Pesticide Usage SuiVey, MAFF) 
Classification (ref. ISIS/RISKLINE database; Van Rijn et al., 1995; Worthing, 1991) 
- Nicotine: Very toxic to aquatic organisms and may cause long-term adverse effects in the aquatic 
environment: category I 
- DichloiVos: Very toxic to aquatic organisms: category V 
- Fenbutatin oxide: Very toxic to aquatic organisms and may cause long-term adverse effects in 
the aquatic environment: category I 
- Propoxur: Toxic to aquatic organisms: category VI. 
Alternatives (ref. Pesticide Usage SuiVey, MAFF) 
Potato starch, Anagrus spp., Therodiplosis persicae,Diglyphus isaea, Amblyseius sp. 
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I. Pesticide chain 4: Insecticides in cucumbers in the Netherlands 
Identification 
Crop: Cucumbers 
Function pesticide: insecticide; protection of crop by killing the insects 
Important chemical means: 
- Dichlorvos (inhibition of  neurotransmitter transport in nerve systems) 
- Methiocarb (inhibition of neurotransmitter transport in nerve systems) 
- Methomyl (inhibition of neurotransmitter transport in nerve systems) 
Country: The Netherlands (Westland) 
Volume applied per  year (base year 1995, CBS, 1997) 
- Dichlorvos: 2.54 ton (aGtive ingredient) (3.1  kg/ha) 
- Methiocarb: 1.41 ton (active ingredient);(1.7 kg/ha) 
I 
- Methomyl: 1.0 ton (active ingredient) (1.2 kg/ha) 
Three a.i.: about 90% of total insecticides applied on cucumber in The Netherlands. 
Costs (costs pesticide as percentage of  the total yield) 
2% (estimated on the basis of the total of insecticides mentioned in LEI-DLO, 1994) 
Price per  kilogram ofactive ingredients 
- Dichlorvos: 45 Euro 
- Methiocarb: 120 Euro 
- Methomyl: 90 Euro 
Type of  business 
Average size of farm: 3.9 ha (LEI-DLO, 1994) 
Classification (ref. ISIS/RISKLINE database; Van Rijn et al., 1995; Worthing, 1991) 
- Dichlorvos: Very toxic to aquatic organisms: category V 
- Methiocarb: Very toxic to aquatic organisms: category V 
- Methomyl:  Very  toxic to  aquatic organisms  and  may  cause  long-term  adverse  effects  in  the 
aquatic environment: category I (i.e. worst case scenario because actually few data on biodegra-
dation in water are available; only data about pure water: results vary from good biodegradability to 
persistency). 
Alternatives 
- Bi~logical crop protection (CBS, 1997) 
- 5 predators are used against 4 frequently occurring insect plagues 
- most widely' used  (about 90%  of area)  is  mite Amblyseius cucumeris against  Thrips  tabaci or 
Frankliniella occidentalis. 
- other predator-insect plagues combinations are only marginally used; however the importance of 
biological crop protection in specialist horticulture in The Netherlands is increasing. 
- The  application  of the  mite  Amblyseius  cucumeris  (product  "Thripex-plus")  or insects  of the 
Red.uviidae family as  preventive alternatives to chemical means costs about 3-10 ECU/100 m2). 
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Identification 
Crop: Potatoes 
Function pesticide: fungicide: protection against Phytophthora infestans, causing potato disease 
Important chemical means; 
- Fluazinam (inhibition of cell division in fungi) 
- Mancozeb (blockade of metabolism in fungi by inhibiting certain enzymes in citric acid cycle) 
Country: Sweden 
Volume applied per  year (ref. National Chemical Inspectorate 1996) 
- Fluazinam: 25.5 ton (active ingredient) 
- Mancozeb: 39.2 ton (active ingredient) 
Mancozeb mostly in combination with propamocarb and metalaxyl. Only used if necessary or if fluazinam 
can not be applied because of certain weather conditions. 
Costs (costs pesticide as a percentage of  the total yield) 
2% (estimated on the basis of dose and price of formulation, by Swedish Board of Agriculture) 
Price per kilogram (ref. Swedish Board of Agriculture): 
- Fluazinam: 120 Euro 
- Mancozeb: 30 Euro 
Type of  businesses 
Average  size  of farm:  31  ha  (estimated  on  the  basis  of acreage  of arable  land  and  number of 
farms; ref. the National Statistics Office of Sweden 1996) 
Classification (ref. ISIS/RISKLINE database; Van Rijn et al.,  1995; Worthing, 1991) 
Fluazinam: Very toxic to aquatic organisms: category V 
Mancozeb: Toxic to aquatic organisms: category VI 
Alternatives (ref. Swedish Board ·of Agriculture) 
Use of uninfected seeds,  buying special seeds such as uninfected seeds will  be more expensive 
for the farmer but will at the same time save the expenditure for chemical pesticides. 
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Pesticide chain 6: Fungicides in potatoes in the Netherlands 
Identification 
Culture: Potatoes (agriculture); 
Function pesticide: fungicide; protection against Phytophthora infestans, causing potato ijisease; 
Important chemical means; 
- TriphE:myltinacetate (is absorbed by fungi. Inhibition of important physiological processes, causing 
death of fungi) 
- Mancozeb (blockade of metabolism in fungi by inhibiting certain enzymes in citric acid cycle) 
- Maneb  (blockade of metabolism in fungi by inhibiting certain enzymes in citric acid cycle) 
- Fluazinam (inhibition of cell division in fungi) 
Country: The Netherlands 
Volume applied per.year (ref. CBS, 1995) 
- Triphenyltinacetate: 126 ton (active ingredient) i. 
- Mancozeb: 511  ton (active ingredient)  ·• 
- Maneb: 557 ton (active ingredient) 
- Fluazinam: 115 ton (active ingredient) 
Costs (costs pesticide as a percentage of  the total yield) 
< 6% (estimated on the basis of the total of fungicides mentioned in LEI-DLO, 1994) 
Price per kilogram: 
- Triphenyltinacetate: 40 Euro 
- Mancozeb: 7 Euro 
- Maneb: 5 Euro 
~ Fluazinam: 90 Euro 
Type of  businesses 
Average size of farm: 42 ha (ref.: LEI-DLO, 1994; common for agriculture); 
Classificatio,n (ref. ISIS/RISKLINE database; Van Rijn et al., 1995; Worthing, 1991) 
- Triphenyltinacetate: Very toxic to aquatic organisms and may cause long-term adverse effects in 
the aquatic environment: category I 
- Mancozeb: Toxic to aquatic organisms: category VI 
- Maneb: Very toxic to aquatic organisms: category V 
- Fluazinam: Very toxic to aquatic organisms: category V 
Alternatives 
Preventive and biological counteraction:- Use of resistant crops: Approx. 50% (ref.: HASKONING 
& LEI-DLO, 1995); - Use of untainted seeds; 
- Moderate use of nitrogen; In an early stage: 
- Killing of the culture. 
In general the use of resistant crops and/or untainted seeds will be more expensive for the farmer 
but will at the same time save the expenditure for chemical pesticides. 
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Identification 
Crop: Co~ 
Function pesticide: herbicide: prevention from/destruction of weeds 
Important chemical means: 
- Atrazin (Inhibition/disturbance of photosynthesis) 
- Bentazon (inhibition/disturbance of photosynthesis) 
- Pyridate (inhibition/disturbance of photosynthesis) 
- Country: The Netherlands 
Volume applied per  year (based year 1995; CBS, 1997) 
- Atrazin: 1_54.2 ton (active ingredient) (0.7 kg/ha) 
- Bentazon: 99.9 ton (active ingredient) (0.5 kg/ha) 
- Pyridate: 56.6 ton (active ingredient) (ri.3 kg/ha) 
Cost (costs pesticide as percentage of  the total yield) 
About 6% (estimated on the basis of the total of herbicides mentioned in LEI-DLO, 1994) 
Price per kilogram 
- Atrazin: 10 Euro 
- Bentazon: 35 Euro 
- Pyridate: 55 Euro 
Type of  business 
Average size of_farm: 42 ha (LEI-DLO, 1994) 
Classification (ref. !SIS/RISKLINE database; Van Rijn et al., 1995; Worthing, 1991) 
- Atrazin: Toxic to aquatic organisms and may cause long-term adverse effects in the aquatic envi-
ronment: category II  · 
- Bentazon: Harmful to aquatic organisms and may cause long-term adverse effects in the aquatic 
-environment: category Ill (i.e. worst case scenario because actually few data on biodegradation in · 
water are available; bentazon is expected to biodegrade moderately, depending on the presence 
of specific micro~organisms) 
- Pyridate: Harmful to aquatic organisms: category VII 
Alternatives (CBS, 1997; PAGV & IKC, 1993; PAGV, 1995) 
Mechanical weed control in com is gaining importance. In 1995 mechanical weed control was ap-
plied at about 26% of the area used for com cultivation. This was among others caused by ~timu­
lation of specialised equipment for this crop (weed harrow). A 1  00% mechanical treatment of the 
field, however, is often praCtically impossible to perform. This is caused by the fact that the timing 
of such activity is .extremely important and that the farmer often hires some contract workers to do 
the job. The combination of an exact timing of mechanical weed control, a perfectly prepared crop 
field and the time schedule of contract workers appears to be impossible in practice. 
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II 
• Pesticide chain 8: Herbicides in winter. barleY in England and Wales 
Identification 
Culture: Winter barley 
Function pesticide: herbicide: prevention from/destruction of weeds; 
Important chemical means; 
- lsoproturon (inhibition of  transport electrons in cells; disturbance photosynthesis) 
- Pendimethalin (inhibition of cell division in weeds) 
- Meco_prop (uncontrolled plant growth because of auxin-like effect of mecoprop) 
- Tri-allate (inhibition of cell division and extension in grow tips of plant) 
Country: England/Wales 
Volume applied per  year(ref.: Pesticide Usage Survey, MAFF) 
- ~soproturon: 719.20 ton (active ingredient)  · 
- Pendimethalin: 125.39 ton (active ingredient) 
- Mecoprop: 82.14 ton (active ingredient) 
- Tri-allate: 67.74 ton (active ingredient) 
Costs (costs pesticide as a percentage of  the totiJI yield) 
5% (estimated on the basis of the total of herbicides mentioned in LEI-DLO, 1994) 
Price per kilogram (ref. Pesticide Usage Survey, MAFF) 
- lsoproturon: 12 Euro 
- Pendimethalin: 28 Euro 
- Mecoprop: 10 Euro 
- Tri-allate: 17 Euro 
Type of  businesses 
Average size of farm: 233 ha (ref.: Pesticide Usage Survey, MAFF) 
Classification (ref. ISI'S/RISKLINE database; Van Rijn et al., 1995; Worthing, 1991) 
- lsoproturon: Toxic to aquatic organisms and may cause long-.term adverse effects in the aquatic 
environment: category II 
- Pendimethalin: Very toxic to aquatic organisms and may cause long-term adverse effects in the 
aquatic environment: category I 
- Mecoprop: Harmful to aquatic organisms: category VII 
- Tri-allate: Very -toxic to aquatic organisms: category V 
Alternatives (ref.: Pesticide Usage Survey, MAFF) 
None 
ElM I Haskoning  99 Pesticide chain 9: Fungicides in winter wheat in Sweden 
Identification 
Crop: Winter wheat 
Function pesticide: fungicide: protection against leaf and ear diseases in winter wheat (a/o. rust, 
mildew) 
Important chemical means; 
- Fenpropimorf (is absorbed by fungi. Inhibition of steroid production, causing death of fungi) 
- Propiconazol (is absorbed by fungi. Inhibition of important physiological processes, causing death 
of fungi) 
- (Azoxystrobin: (approved on Swedish market only in  1997; application is expected to increase in 
following years)) 
Country: Sweden 
Volume applied per  year (ref. National Chelnical Inspectorate 1996) 
- Fenpropimorf: 54.0 ton (active ingredient) 
- Propiconazol: 27.6 ton (active ingredient) 
Fenpropimorf is mostly used in a mixture with propiconazol. 
Costs (costs pesticide as a percentage of  the total yield) 
4% (estimated on the basis of dose and price of formulation, by Swedish Board of Agriculture) 
Prices per kilogram (ref. Swedish Board of  Agriculture): 
- Fenpropimorf: 40 Euro 
- Propiconazol: 240 Euro 
Type of  businesses 
Average  size  of farm:  33  ha  (estimated  on  base  of acreage  of arable  land  and  number of farms;  ref.  the 
National Statistics Office of Sweden 1996) 
Classification (ref. ISIS/RISKLINE database; Van Rijn et al., 1995; Worthing, 1991) 
- Fenpropimorf:  Toxic  to  aquatic  organisms  and  may  cause  long-term  adverse  effects  in  the 
aquatic environment: category II (i.e.  worst case scenario because actually no  data on  biodegra-
dation in water are available) 
- Propiconazol: Toxic to aquatic organisms and may cause long-term adverse effects in the aquatic 
environment: category II 
Alternatives (ref. Swedish Board of Agriculture) 
Crop rotation, use of resistant strains, use of uninfected seeds 
In  general  the  use of resistant strains  and/or uninfected  seeds  will  be  more  expensive  for  the 
farmer but will at the same time save the expenditure for chemical pesticides. Adequate crop rota-
tion does not have to result in increasing costs. 
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\ Pesticide chain 10: Herbicides in public pavements and roads fn the Netherlands 
Identification 
Culture:-
Function pesticide: herbicide: prevention from/destruction of weeds 
Important chemical means (from Galjaard et at, 1997); 
- Diuron (inhibition of photosynthesis) 
- Glyfosate (inhibition synthesis amino acids) 
- Amitrol (inhibition carotene production and bud sprouting) 
- Simazin (inhibition of transport electrons in cells; disturbance photosynthesis) 
Country: The Netherlands 
Volume use applied per  year (base year 1995, from Galjaard et at, 1997) 
- Diuron: 10.7 ton (active ingredient) 
- Glyfosate: 9.8 ton (active ingredient) 
i 
·• 
- Amitrol: 1.8 ton (active ingredient) 
- Simazin: 0.4 ton (active ingredient) 
i' 
Costs (costs pesticide as a percentage of  the total yield) 
General costs of weed treatment on public pavements and roads in The Netherlands (Siuijsmans & Drijver, 
1996) 
Selective ~praying by hand: 0.04 Euro I m2 
· Full field spraying by hand: 0.08 Euro I m2 
Full field spraying by spraying boom: 0.03 Euro I m2 
Price 
See total costs ad 3 (conventional) and ad 7 (alternatives) 
Type of  businesses 
Weed control by governmental institutions (municipalities, water authorities etc.) 
Classification (ref. ISIS/RISKLINE database; Van Rijn et at.,  1995; Worthing, 1991) 
- DiurQn: Toxic to aquatic organisms and may cause long-term adverse effects in the aquatic en-
viror~ment: category II 
- Glyfosate:  Harmful  to  aquatic  organisms  and  may  cause  long-term  adverse  effects  in  the 
aquatic environment: category Ill 
- Amifrol: Toxic to aquatic organisms and may cause long-term aqverse effects in the aquatic envi-
ronment:  category II (i.e. worst case scenario because no good.  data on  biodegradation in water 
are available; in pure water without micro-organisms poor degradation of amitrol) 
- Simazin: Harmful to aquatic organisms and may cause long-term adverse effects in th.e aquatic 
environment: category Ill (results vary strongly) 
Alternatives 
Selective  spraying  by  means  of  advanced  equipment  (with  sensors):  2-5  cents/m2  (=0.02 
ECUtm2); Mechanical removal  (brushing):  10 cents/m2 (=0.05 ECUtm2); Physical removal  (burn-
ing): 5 centstm2· (=0.02 ECUtm2); Physical rem~val (steam): ·5 centstm2 (=0.02 ECUtm2). 
Remarks: 2 and 3 are already widely applied whereas 1 and 4 are applied at a limited scale. 
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